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Abstract 
This research analyzed United States Transportation Command Acquisition 
(TCAQ) using the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at 
Federal Agencies. In 2008, the USTRANSCOM applied for and received head-of-
agency authority to manage its acquisition programs, resulting in TCAQ restructuring 
to include the program management function. The objective of this research was to 
compare organizational structure, processes and critical success factors using the 
GAO Framework to derive a web-based survey, including conducting semi-
structured interviews with TCAQ professionals and stakeholders. As a result of our 
research, we recommend the following suggestions to TCAQ: continue the use of 
cross-functional teams to maintain the collaborative environment within the 
organization; continue the use of “Director’s Calls,” and evaluate the efficacy of 
current performance metrics; consider establishing an intern program to train entry-
level project managers; and encourage and fund graduate education for applicable 
employees. 
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This research examined the United States Transportation Command 
Acquisition (TCAQ) using the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function at Federal Agencies. In 2008, the USTRANSCOM applied for and received 
head-of-agency authority to manage its acquisition programs, resulting in TCAQ 
restructuring to include the program management function. 
Analysis and conclusions were based on researcher developed, web-based, 
anonymous surveys and semi-structured interviews with TCAQ personnel. Survey 
statements were derived from the GAO Framework to conduct this qualitative 
assessment of TCAQ’s acquisition function and critical success factors, i.e., 
components believed to be necessary for the system to be successful. It is then the 
“fit” of these components, among an array of external environmental and internal 
design factors, that ultimately determines performance. 
A positive finding was that TCAQ leadership was perceived to communicate 
effectively, including having a positive attitude towards the workforce during 
restructuring. However, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the 
acquisition process were not perceived to be well defined. Additionally, we found 
that TCAQ leadership was perceived to hold stakeholders accountable for their 
actions and used cross-functional teams, which teams used project plans. There 
appeared to be insufficient metrics related to acquisition efficiency; therefore, metrics 
results may be insufficiently briefed to leadership. TCAQ may lack mechanisms for 
anticipating, identifying and reacting to risks. 
We recommend continuing the use of cross-functional teams to maintain the 
collaborative environment within the organization. We also recommend continuing 
the use of “Director’s Calls” and evaluating the efficacy of current performance 
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I.  Acquisition in USTRANSCOM 
A.  Introduction 
The first chapter of this report introduces the research by providing 
background for studying United States Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) 
Acquisition Organization. Furthermore, this chapter will explain the potential benefits 
and limitations of this research. Finally, we will discuss the methodology for 
conducting this research and give a brief overview of the subsequent chapters. 
B.  Environment 
The current perception of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition 
structure and processes is that it needs to be “reexamined and in great detail”—this  
according to a memo dated June 7, 2005, from Gordon England, acting Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (2005, p. 1). The memo was in response to an outcry from 
Congress over its concern about the DoD acquisition process (England, 2005). In 
addition to acting Deputy Secretary of Defense England’s comments, the United 
States General Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that assessed the 
performance of 54 major weapons acquisition programs and found that 26 of them 
experienced a cost growth of almost 15%, along with a 19% increase in schedule 
over the original estimates (GAO, 2005a, p. 1). To further illustrate this concern, in 
2005, Senator John Warner, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, said that 
he was worried that the Pentagon’s process for buying weapons and complex 
systems may be broken. Senator Warner went on to say, “The time has long come 
for a top-to-bottom review of the department’s acquisition organization, its 
acquisition work force and its acquisition process” (Warner, 2005, p. 1). 
This research project is an analysis of the USTRANSCOM’s Command 
Acquisition organization (TCAQ). In 2008, the USTRANSCOM received acquisition 
authority to manage its own Services and Information Technology (IT) acquisition 
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organization’s mission and needs, as well as how the recent reorganization of TCAQ 
affected program management processes. The tool used for assessing the research 
focus is the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal 
Agencies. Within the Framework, the research utilized recommended questions in 
the creation of an internet-based survey applied to TCAQ personnel. Semi-
structured interviews were also conducted at the USTRANSCOM’s Headquarters, 
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. The results were then analyzed to measure the level of 
consistency or inconsistency with that of the GAO Framework’s critical success 
factors. The GAO Framework will be discussed in depth in Chapter II. The research 
objective will be discussed in the following section. 
C.  Research Objective 
The objective of this report is to analyze TCAQ’s current organizational 
structure and processes using the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function at Federal Agencies. This analysis will provide TCAQ with useful, objective 
analysis of its organization, in addition to recommendations for future research. 
The two primary goals of the research are as follows: 
 To provide TCAQ with an assessment of its organizational structure 
 To review and analyze TCAQ’s program management processes 
The research questions for this project are as follows: 
 How does TCAQ align acquisition with the organization’s mission and 
needs? 
 How has TCAQ’s recent reorganization affected program management 
processes? 
These research questions address requested areas of study by TCAQ 
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D.  Benefits of Research 
By assessing TCAQ’s current organizational structure and processes, and by 
identifying consistencies and inconsistencies with the GAO Framework’s critical 
success factors, the analysis will provide an external, objective view of the current 
state of the TCAQ organization. TCAQ can apply the recommendations based on 
the analysis of findings as well as explore the recommended areas for further 
research to make improvements to its organizational structure and processes. 
E.  Limitations and Assumptions 
This research will be limited to the use of only one organizational assessment 
tool: the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal 
Agencies. In addition, the research will utilize questions from the first two 
cornerstones of the GAO Framework in creating the survey that will be applied to the 
TCAQ workforce. The cornerstones of the GAO Framework that will be utilized are 
Organizational Alignment and Leadership and Policies and Processes. Furthermore, 
this is not a quantitative research study that focuses on statistical significance, but 
rather a qualitative exploratory study. In addition, the data obtained from the survey 
is limited to only the number of survey respondents. Finally, the GAO Framework 
has never been utilized at TCAQ for this type of analysis; therefore, there are no 
historical data with which to compare our results.  
 The major assumption of this research is that collected data is an actual 
reflection of TCAQ’s current state with regard to organizational structure and 
program management processes. The next section of this chapter will explain the 
methodology of this research. 
F.  Methodology 
The methodology of this research was designed to determine and analyze 
TCAQ’s acquisition functions from the perspectives of organizational structure and 
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chapter of this research include studies and reports from the GAO, documentation 
provided by the USTRANSCOM, and multiple Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
guidance documents. This research includes TCAQ workforce survey results that 
provide insight related to the alignment of acquisition with the organization’s mission 
and needs, as well as how the recent reorganization of TCAQ affected program 
management processes. The research project team created an internet survey 
based on recommended questions from the first two cornerstones in the GAO 
Framework. Data collected from the surveys was analyzed to show consistencies 
and inconsistencies with the GAO Framework’s critical success factors. 
The GAO Framework was developed to facilitate high-level, qualitative 
assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the acquisition function at federal 
agencies (GAO, 2005b, p.vii). The GAO Framework consists of four interrelated 
cornerstones:  (1) Organizational Alignment and Leadership, (2) Policies and 
Processes, (3) Human Capital, and (4) Knowledge and Information Management. 
This research utilizes only Cornerstones 1 and 2. The GAO Framework is designed 
as an integrated evaluation approach, but each of the cornerstones can stand alone 
so that Framework users can tailor evaluations to an agency’s specific needs. 
1.  Cornerstone 1: Organizational Alignment and Leadership 
Organizational alignment is the appropriate placement of the acquisition 
function in the agency, with stakeholders having clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities.  There is no single, optimal way to organize an agency’s acquisition 
function. Each agency must assess whether the current placement of its acquisition 
function is meeting its organizational needs. Committed leadership enables strategic 
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2.  Cornerstone 2: Policies and Processes 
Implementing strategic decisions to achieve agency-wide outcomes requires 
clear and transparent policies that are implemented consistently. Policies establish 
expectations about the management of the acquisition function. Processes are the 
means by which the management functions will be performed and implemented in 
support of agency missions. Effective policies and processes govern the planning, 
awarding, administration and oversight of acquisition efforts with a focus on assuring 
these efforts achieve intended results (GAO, 2005b p.viii). 
G.  Organization of Research 
This report is organized into five chapters designed to provide a clear view of 
the research approach and results. 
Chapter I provides an introduction, background, objectives and limitations, 
and a methodology overview that touches on Cornerstones 1 and 2 of the GAO 
Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies. 
Chapter II is a literature review encompassing key documents and references 
utilized in the research. Chapter II examines the current DoD acquisition 
environment, the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), and the relevant acquisition 
statutes and directives. Furthermore, Chapter II reviews a sample of organizational 
assessment tools along with the benefits of using such tools. Finally, the GAO 
Framework will be explored deeper, and we will discuss how it is specifically applied 
to the analysis of the TCAQ organization. 
Chapter III provides a detailed view of the USTRANSCOM, including its 
organizational structure, changes, acquisition history, current acquisition programs, 
etc.  The premise of Chapter III is to provide the reader with a clear view of the 
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Chapter IV discusses the findings of the survey applied to TCAQ. This 
chapter also analyzes those findings as well as offer recommendations based on the 
analysis. 
Chapter V provides a summary of the research, research questions and 
goals, conclusion to the research, and recommendations for further research. 
H.  Summary 
The goal of Chapter I was to provide the reader with sufficient information to 
understand the background and objective of this research. In addition, this chapter 
highlighted the potential benefits and limitations of this research. Moreover, Chapter 
I explained the methodology as well as the organization of this research. Next, 
Chapter II will provide a literature review investigating the DoD’s acquisition 
environment, system, and policies. The benefits of utilizing organizational 
assessments, along with a sample of organizational assessment tools, will also be 
explored. Finally, the GAO Framework will be discussed in depth as the specific tool 
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II.  Literature Review 
A.   Introduction 
The literature review is presented in six sections. The first discusses the 
Defense Acquisition Environment. The second section transitions into the Defense 
Acquisition System as a whole. The third section focuses on the relevant statutory 
regulations pertaining to DoD acquisition. The fourth section describes the current 
state of DoD acquisition through an examination of recent reports that outline major 
problems and negative focus areas. The fifth section highlights the potential benefits 
of utilizing an organizational assessment as well as outlines a sample of assessment 
tools. The final section describes the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition 
Function at Federal Agencies (GAO, 2005b). This GAO Framework is the specific 
tool used in this research to analyze TCAQ’s organizational structure and processes. 
B.  Defense Acquisition Environment 
The current Defense Acquisition Environment consists of a triad between 
Congress, the executive branch, and industry. The DoD Program Manager (PM) fits 
directly in the middle of this triad and is constantly receiving and delivering 
information to the entities mentioned above. Figure 1 depicts this environment and 
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Figure 1. The Acquisition Environment  
(From DAU, 2008, p. 5) 
The next section will discuss the Defense Acquisition System. The Defense 
Acquisition System is the DoD’s implementation of a program management 
approach to defense acquisition. 
C.  Defense Acquisition System 
“The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the Nation’s investments 
in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National 
Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces” (DAU, 2009, 
Foreword). 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) is the management process by which 
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2007). The DAS is based on centralized regulations and processes; however, a 
decentralized approach to program execution is granted to focus on efficient 
completion of acquisition activities (DAU, 2009, p. 1). The DoD 5000 series was 
created to provide governing policy and direction for the acquisition of major defense 
systems. The following subsections will describe these directives. 
1.  DoD Directive 5000.01 
Certified current as of November 20, 2007, DoDD 5000.01 applies to DoD Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
defines an acquisition program as a directed, funded effort that provides a new, 
improved or continuing material, weapon or information system or service capability 
in response to an approved need (DAU, 2008). The Directive establishes an 
investment strategy to posture the DoD to support today’s needs as well as needs of 
future forces and requirements.  Additionally, DoDD 5000.01 states that the following 
principles will be followed in order to create a streamlined and effective organization:  
flexibility, responsiveness, innovation, and discipline. The Directive also states the 
DoD will “maintain a proficient acquisition, technology and logistics workforce that is 
flexible and highly skilled across a range of management, technical and business 
disciplines” (DoDD, 2007, p. 8). 
However, the Directive does not provide guidance to specific defense 
systems.  To govern the implementation of these acquisition policies and principles, 
DoDI 5000.02 was created. 
2.  DoD Instruction 5000.02 
The purpose of this instruction is to establish a simplified and flexible 
management framework for translating capability needs and technology 
opportunities, based on approved capability needs, into stable, affordable, 
and well-managed acquisition programs that include weapon systems, 
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Current as of December 8, 2008, the Instruction also defines the 
responsibilities of the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), Heads of the DoD 
Components (USD (AT&L), 2008), and PMs. The Instruction is divided into ten major 
sections that cover topics such as procedures, Acquisition Category (ACAT), 
acquisition of services, and program management. DoDI 5000.02 also provides a 
diagram of the Defense Acquisition Management Process, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Defense Acquisition Management Process 
(From USD (AT&L), 2008, p. 12) 
The PM and MDA are required to use the Defense Acquisition Management 
Process when acquiring defense systems. The previous instruction allowed the MDA 
to authorize entrance into the acquisition system at any point; however, the new 
policy requires all programs proceed through a formal acquisition process. The 
progression through the acquisition lifecycle is dependent upon satisfactory 
knowledge acquired and efforts made by the PM. DoDI 5000.02 provides a partial 
listing of the types of knowledge (based on demonstrated accomplishments) that 
enable accurate assessments of technology, design maturity, and production 
readiness (DAU, 2009, p. 39). 
While the DoDI 5000.02 defines the DoD acquisition management process 
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acquisition development and contracting as well as implements statutory 
requirements. The next subsection outlines the FAR and describes how this key 
regulation governs specific pieces of DoD acquisition. 
3.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
The FAR is the primary regulation for use by federal executive agencies in the 
acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds (DAU, 2009). The FAR 
was established for the codification and publication of uniform policies and 
procedures for acquisitions by all executive agencies (GSA, 2009). In addition, the 
DoD has a supplement to the FAR called the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which provides specific guidance on supporting 
FAR policy. The FAR is the utmost level of authority relating to contracting 
regulations and creates the common language in contracts initiated by the DoD. 
Specifically pertaining to major systems acquisition, FAR Part 34 describes 
acquisition policies and procedures for use in acquiring these systems consistent 
with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A–109. FAR Part 34 
establishes the following criteria to define which acquisitions will be designated as 
major: 
 Are directed at and critical to fulfilling an agency mission need 
 Entail allocating relatively large resources for the particular agency 
 Warrant special management attention, including specific agency-head 
decisions 
FAR Part 34 continues to explain that the policies are designed to ensure that 
agencies acquire major systems in the most effective, economical, and timely 
manner. 
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D.  Statutory Requirements 
Statutory requirements are rules that are based on the passage of a statute 
by the legislative branch and must be followed under penalty of the law (DAU, 2009). 
This section will discuss four of these statutory requirements that have a direct 
impact on DoD Acquisitions. 
1.  Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
On May 22, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act. According to Senator Carl Levin, the sponsor of the Reform 
Act, “report after report has indicated that the key to successful acquisition programs 
is getting things right from the start with sound systems engineering, cost-estimating, 
and developmental—testing early in the program cycle” (Levin, 2009). 
This Act recognized the fact that recent attempts at acquisition reform by the 
DoD had resulted in excessive cost growth and schedule delays due to personnel 
cuts in these critical acquisition areas. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
is divided into two titles: Acquisition Organization and Acquisition Policy. The key 
provisions of the Reform Act are the appointment of a Director of Systems 
Engineering who will be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on systems 
engineering and will develop policies and guidance for the use of systems 
engineering as well as review, approve, and monitor such testing for each MDAP. 
The Act also contains a requirement that the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering periodically assess technological maturity of MDAPs and annually 
report finding to Congress, requiring the use of prototyping, when practical.  It 
requires that combatant commanders have more influence in the requirements 
generation process, and outlines changes to the Nunn-McCurdy Act, including 
rescinding the most recent Milestone approval for any program experiencing critical 
cost growth. Finally, the Act has a requirement that the DoD revise guidelines and 
tighten regulations governing conflicts of interest by contractors working on MDAPs 
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The next act we will discuss is the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which is 
specific to IT programs such as those managed by TCAQ. 
2.  Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 is also known as the IT Management Reform 
Act. The Act assigns the OMB Director to be responsible for improving the 
acquisition, use, and disposal of IT systems. The OMB, in turn, created Circular A–
130 to develop processes for analyzing, tracking, and evaluating the risks and 
results of all major IT investments by Federal agencies. In addition, Clinger-Cohen 
requires each Agency Head to establish clear accountability for IT management 
activities by appointing a Chief Information Officer (CIO). The CIO is tasked to help 
control system development risks, better manage technology spending, and succeed 
in achieving real, measurable improvements in agency performance. Clinger-Cohen 
directly affects TCAQ because of its extensive IT program portfolio and recent 
delegation as Agency Head. Agency-head authority will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter III. 
Two years before the Clinger-Cohen Act was signed into law, Congress 
attempted to reform DoD Acquisition with the passing of the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act.  This act will be discussed in the next section. 
3.  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) was signed into law on 
October 13, 1994. The Act was created in response to Congressional concerns that 
federal agencies’ acquisition practices were wasteful and cumbersome. Title V of the 
Act contains performance-based management provisions to foster the development 
of measureable cost, schedule and performance goals and incentives for acquisition 
personnel to reach these goals (GAO, 1997). In addition, the FASA called for the 
development of a Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) for automating 
the procurement process. FACNET was to be the preferred means for conducting 
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$100,000 simplified acquisition threshold. Acquisitions over the micro purchase limit 
but not exceeding $100,000 are reserved for small businesses. There are a few 
exceptions such as required sources of supply or a sole source. However, the 1998 
Defense Authorization Act removed this statutory goal and allowed agencies to use 
other electronic contracting means. 
In addition to the DoD Acquisition regulations and statutes described earlier, 
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act is another important 
component that comprises the DAS. The next section will discuss this Act and the 
defense acquisition workforce as a whole. 
4.  Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was initially 
Public Law 101–510 on November 5, 1990. DAWIA was intended to "improve the 
effectiveness of the personnel who manage and implement defense acquisition 
programs” (USC, 2004, p. 295). As part of the fiscal year 1991 Defense 
Authorization Act, the Act called for establishing an Acquisition Corps and 
professionalizing the acquisition workforce through education, training, and work 
experience. While the Act applied to both civilian and military personnel, it 
emphasized the need to offer civilians greater opportunities for professional 
development and advancement (Garcia, Keyner, Robillard & Van Mullekom, 1997). 
DAWIA is divided into five subsections, as follows: General Authorities & 
Responsibilities, Defense Acquisition Positions, Acquisition Corps, Education & 
Training, and General Management Provisions. Under the subsection titled, Defense 
Acquisition Positions, DAWIA lists such positions as follows: Program Management, 
Engineering, Contracting, Financial Management, and Logistics. In addition, the 
minimum education, training, and experience requirements for each position are 
detailed in section 1723 of DAWIA. Finally, DAWIA outlines the establishment and 
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In addition to the previously mentioned statutes, the Truth in Negotiation Act 
(TINA) and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) also have a major effect on 
the program management policies and processes within the Defense Acquisition 
System. 
The previous sections established the foundation of the DAS through the 
description of the applicable regulations, statutes and the DoD acquisition workforce.  
The next section will transition into a review of recent reports that describe the 
current state of the Defense Acquisition System. 
E.  Current State of the Defense Acquisition System 
Even with an established system, educated workforce, and governing 
regulations and statutes, the Defense Acquisition System has experienced intense 
scrutiny from Congress. From 1986 through 2009, there have been numerous 
reports describing inefficiencies, inadequate performance, and other negative trends 
relating to the DAS.  This research will discuss the findings of a sample of these 
reports to establish the current state of the DAS. The sample of reports that will be 
discussed include A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President (Packard, 
1986), GAO Report on Weapons Acquisition (GAO, 1992), The Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (Kadish,  2005), Reforming the Defense Acquisition 
Enterprise (Business Executives for National Security, 2009), and the GAO Report 
to Congressional Committees, Defense Acquisition Assessment of Selected 
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1.  A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President 
In 1986, by order of President Reagan, a report was published about the current 
state of DoD Acquisition because of “the public’s shaken confidence in the 
effectiveness of the acquisition system” (Packard, 1986, p. 41). The commission’s 
charter was to “evaluate the defense acquisition system, to determine how it might 
be improved, and to recommend changes that can lead to the acquisition of military 
equipment with equal or greater performance but at lower cost and with less delay” 
(Packard, 1986, p. 41).  The report gives an overview of the current acquisition 
process before outlining recommendations, some of which are in place today. 
An establishment of certain positions was the Packard Commission’s first set 
of legislative recommendations. These positions include Undersecretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (this is how the position is referred to 
today) and Service Acquisition Executives. Furthermore, education and training were 
emphasized for civilian contractors and government employees as well as emphasis 
on expertise requirements required by federal law (Packard, 1986, p. 53). 
Program stability was the primary target of the Regulatory Recommendations 
Section. The commission first made mention of adopting baselining for major 
weapon systems at the beginning of engineering development. Baselining, in the 
sense mentioned above, refers to the “process in which all key participants in a 
program or project agree on the detailed description of the objectives and 
performance requirements, and commit to execute it accordingly” (“Baselining,” 
n.d.). The second major recommendation was to increase the level of use of multi-
year contracts for systems that have a high priority.  Furthermore, the commission 
makes mention of using industry-style competition, focusing more on overall best 
value rather than just on the lowest-price provider, luring in more quality suppliers at 
a lower price (Packard, 1986, p. 59). 
The area of culture was the third segment on which the commission made 
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and recommendations. DoD PM’s were identified in the report to be “unable to 
balance competing demands from special interest advocates, the Pentagon, and 
Congress, inevitably becoming a class of [humble petitioners] for these programs, as 
opposed to managers” (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 62). 
Specialized training and proper professional conditioning was said to be one 
of the remedies to the problem (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 
62).  Professional conditioning refers to gaining experience in a specific acquisition-
related field, such as program management, contracting, finance, etc. Additionally, 
reliance on the private sector for technology and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
items, as well as increased weapon system prototyping, was stressed (Packard, 
1986, p. 60). Improvement of cost estimations and increased information reliability 
were the basis for these recommendations (Business Executives for National 
Security, 2009, p. 62). 
The final area that the commission addressed was that of the overall 
organization of the DAS. Joint requirement planning and the program-approval 
process were the focus of this section of the commission’s report, stating that 
through a restructuring of the Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB), 
“the JRMB can make decisions on whether or not full-scale development of 
programs would be initiated, thus ultimately making it responsible for “affordability” 
or “make-or-buy” programs” (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 
63). 
The report describes the affordability decision as a “decision [that] requires a 
subjective judgment be made on how much a new military capability is worth” (p. 
63). Furthermore, “If a new weapon system can be developed and produced at that 
target cost, it may be authorized for development; otherwise, ways should be found 
to extend the life of the existing system” (Packard, 1986, p. 58). The report describes 
the make or buy decision as a “decision [that] requires the JRMB [to] assess the 
need for a unique development program, and determine if it is possible instead to 
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Additionally, the need for an increased caliber of acquisition personnel, as well as a 
higher pay scheme for government civilians, was mentioned. 
The next report to be discussed will be a GAO Report on Weapons Systems 
Acquisition, this report was derived from the report Getting to Best; Reforming the 
Defense Acquisition Enterprise (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 
63).  This report further documents the state of DoD acquisitions. 
2.  GAO Report on Weapons Acquisition 
The December 1992 seminal report from the GAO on weapons acquisition 
focused on the two most prevalent factors in the defense acquisition process at the 
time.  These factors were program cost increases and schedule delays. The GAO 
highlighted that these factors were very interdependent. Program cost increases 
normally drive a delay in schedule while a scheduling delay will likely force an 
increase in the program costs. Moreover, the report identified two causes for these 
factors: cultural and organizational. 
The report defines a cultural cause as the collective patterns of behavior 
exhibited by the participants in the acquisition process as well as the incentives for 
that behavior.  DoD Acquisitions has adopted a culture of blind obedience in which 
program sponsors lack the incentives to accurately present program risk 
assessments and realistic cost estimates. The cancellation of a program is viewed 
as a negative mark against the program manager and sponsor, even if the business 
case justifies it. The report recommends that incentives must motivate participants to 
produce better program success by emphasizing program affordability over program 
survival. 
While the report does not specifically define what organizational cause 
means, it alludes to the acquisition policies that drive diligent analysis of mission 
needs and program costs. Once again, program managers and sponsors tend to 
underestimate costs and schedule times in order to meet the intent of these 
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low by excluding relevant costs, such as training and testing equipment. 
Organizational cause also includes the concept of concurrency. Concurrency is 
defined as the practice of beginning production before the completion of product 
development, testing, and evaluation. This program strategy is used to expedite the 
acquisition timeline of critical weapons systems. While the program’s schedule may 
benefit from concurrency, the costs associated with future program readjustments 
have shown to outweigh the schedule gain. 
The next report to be discussed is the Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment, which was published in 2006. This report was authored due to a “crisis 
of confidence” (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 67), similar to the 
reason the Packard Commission was established. This report further documents the 
state of DoD Acquisition. 
3.  Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report 
The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) was Acting 
Secretary of Defense England’s answer to the still-broken acquisition system in 
2005. The team performing this assessment had the responsibility of analyzing 
“every aspect of acquisition, including requirements, organization, legal foundations 
[…] decision methodology, oversight, checks and balances—every aspect” (Kadish, 
2005, Slide 4).  The final product of this assessment would be “a recommended 
acquisition structure and processes with clear alignment of responsibility, authority, 
and accountability” (Kadish, 2005, Slide 4 ). 
Before this assessment, over 100 acquisition-related studies had been  
completed on the DoD, yet similar problems still exist in the acquisition structure and 
organization.  The top-level conclusions of the study discovered two main points. 
First, there are many deeply imbedded issues within the DoD’s management 
systems (not just within the acquisition structure). Second, the only way for change 
to occur is for “radical changes” to be implemented in order to break old habits and 
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Ultimately, the assessment panel conducted research and reported significant 
recommendations for performance improvement in the following areas of the 
acquisition system: Organization, Workforce, Budget, Requirements, Acquisition, 
and Industry.  These recommendations also came with deadlines for action in order 
to begin the DAS rebuilding process. 
The DAS still has the reputation of being broken and not up to expected 
performance standards, which can be further documented in the next report 
discussed. The Business Executives for National Security is a “national, non-
partisan, non-profit organization that harnesses successful business models from 
the private sector to help strengthen the nation’s security” (Business Executives for 
National Security, 2009, p. 45). This report further documents the current state of 
DoD acquisition. 
4.  Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise 
In July 2009, the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) released 
a report outlining the current state of the United States Military’s acquisition process 
and offering recommendations to make the process more economical and effective. 
The Task Force assembled for this report, formed in 2008, was comprised of experts 
with business backgrounds in the commercial and defense sectors (Business 
Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 2). The charter for the Task Force was to 
examine the defense acquisition process from a business perspective and to make 
recommendations for consideration by Congress and the Department of Defense to 
improve that process (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 2). 
The Task Force breaks the report into sections that first outline the Principles 
of Successful Acquisition (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. v). 
The following items are identified by the BENS report as principles for successful 
acquisition programs: 
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 Strategy and resources: Ends matched to means, 
 Ability to attract and retain able and experienced people, and  
 Commitment to ethical comportment in all activities. (Business 
Executives for National Security, 2009, p. v) 
The report further breaks down the acquisition process and acquisition 
enterprise (the enterprise is comprised of the Department of Defense, participating 
industrial firms, and Congress) into three problem areas: Requirements 
Determination, Acquisition Workforce, and Program Execution (Business Executives 
for National Security, 2009, p. 6). Each area is then analyzed and suggestions for 
improvement are shown. 
The Task Force first dissects the area of Requirements Determination.   
Defining and determining the requirements of a new program is arguably the most 
important step in the acquisition process. The Task Force discusses the problems 
with the requirements-determination process as 
not coupling needs for specific future systems to an overall national defense 
strategy as well as, requirements being largely determined by the military 
services without realistic input as to what is technically feasible from an 
engineering perspective, and without adequate input as to what is affordable 
from a planning, programming and budgeting perspective. (Business 
Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 7) 
Furthermore, the report continues to suggest that the Combatant 
Commanders need to take more of a role in short-term capabilities, whereas the 
military service chiefs should be the ones to focus on more long-term requirements 
(Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 7). 
The second area the Task Force analyzes as an acquisition problem region is 
that of the acquisition workforce. The report discusses how the current workforce is 
understaffed for the workload requirements of today and the future. Furthermore, the 
Task Force mentions that although highly competent, the acquisition enterprise does 
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in synergistic fashion with industry (Business Executives for National Security, 2009, 
p. 8). 
Finally, the third area that the Task Force has identified is the program-
execution phase of the acquisition process. The report states that 
the [acquisition] system has insufficient systems engineering capability; cost 
estimating that injects unrealistic optimism into early program definition; 
dependence on many individuals with limited relevant experience; and little 
management flexibility to fix problems as they occur. (Business Executives for 
National Security, 2009, p. 8) 
Following the analysis of the acquisition enterprise problem areas, the report 
then transitions into recommendations and modifications for each of the areas 
(Requirements Determination, Workforce, and Program Execution). The 
recommendations of the report are aimed at senior officials and policy-makers; 
however, some recommendations can be implemented at lower working levels. 
Additionally, recommendations from a summation of past reports, studies, 
commissions, and analyses are added to this report for reference purposes 
(Business Executives for National Security, 2009, p. 61). 
The report adds to the list of prior research that highlights the problems with 
the defense acquisition enterprise and is further evidence of a broken acquisition 
system.  The final report to be discussed is the GAO Report to Congressional 
Committees, Defense Acquisitions Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs 
(GAO, 2009a), which is a major weapon system approach to showing the current 
state of DoD acquisition. 
5.  GAO Report to Congressional Committees, Defense Acquisition 
Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs 
This seventh annual GAO Defense Acquisition Assessment report provides a 
snapshot of how well the DoD is planning and executing its major weapon 
acquisition programs, an area that has been on the GAO High-risk List since 1990 
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 An analysis of the overall performance of the DoD’s 2008 portfolio of 
96 major defense acquisition programs and a comparison to the 
performance of the portfolio at two other points in time: 5 years ago 
and 1 year ago. The comparison figures are outlined in Table 1. 
 An analysis of current cost and schedule outcomes and knowledge 
attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 47 
weapon programs, primarily in development, from the 2008 portfolio. 
 Data on other factors, such as cost estimating, requirements, software 
management, and program office staffing that could affect program 
stability. 
 An update on DoD acquisition policies. 
Table 1. Analysis of DoD Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 





          portfolio






Number of programs                         77 95 98
 
Total planned commitments $1.2 trillion $1.6 trillion $1.6 trillion
 
Commitments outstanding  $724 billion $786 billion $875 billion
 
Change to total research and 
development costs from first 
estimate 37 percent 40 percent 42 percent
 
Change in total acquisition cost 
from first estimate 19 percent 26 percent 25 percent
 
Estimated total acquisition cost 
growth $183 billion $301 billion* $296 billion
 
Share of programs with 25 percent  
or more increase in program 
acquisition unit cost 41 percent 44 percent 42 percent
 
Average delay in delivering initial 
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As indicated by placement on the GAO High-risk List, DoD acquisition has 
been, and remains, plagued with a history of massive cost overruns and schedule 
delays. The results of this GAO assessment are consistent with past troubles, and 
this most recent assessment comes at a time when the DoD is faced with added 
fiscal and administrative challenges. The ongoing Global War on Terror, among 
other factors, places a heavy burden on the defense budget, while a new 
administration is attempting to reign in a Federal deficit that has reached the highest 
point in history. Regardless of current challenges, it is imperative that areas of 
weakness within DoD acquisition be identified and that corrective actions continue to 
be implemented, closely monitored, and adjusted as necessary. Reports such as 
this GAO assessment provide valuable insight into the programs within the DoD that 
are underperforming. This data could be utilized to assess the project management 
capabilities and organizational structures of the various entities that own the 
specified programs outlined in the report. Ideally, this would lead to improved 
acquisition practices that would reverse the ongoing trend of programs being over 
budget and not meeting original schedules. 
This GAO report provides insight into 96 major defense acquisition programs.  
Overall, the report indicates continued poor overall performance, with the good news 
being modest improvements in total cost growth and improved knowledge regarding 
technology and design at key points in the acquisition process. The downside is 
explained in the report as follows: 
However, the cumulative cost overruns are still staggering—almost $296 
billion in fiscal year 2009 dollars—and the problems are pervasive. […] 
[O]f DoD’s 96 active major defense acquisition programs, 64 programs 
have reported increases in their projected cost since their initial cost 
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The report claims that the DoD and the GAO agree on the following as key 
problem sources: 
 Programs are started with poor foundations and inadequate knowledge 
for developing realistic cost estimates. 
 Programs move forward with artificially low cost estimates, optimistic 
schedules and assumptions, immature technologies and designs, and 
fluid requirements. 
 Changing or excessive requirements cause cost growth. 
 An imbalance between wants and needs contributes to budget and 
program instability. 
The problem sources listed above are closely related to the program-
management processes and organizational structures that are the essence of this 
research. Accurate or inaccurate cost, schedule, and requirements analysis have 
been identified by the GAO as root causes of schedule and budget difficulties. 
Strength and accuracy in these areas begins with proven program-management 
processes and an organizational structure. 
As mentioned in section C of this chapter, the Defense Acquisition System is 
the Department of Defense’s implementation of a program-management approach to 
defense acquisition. An organizational assessment is one way of measuring how 
effective project management is in an organization. The next section will address the 
benefits and provide a sample of the organizational assessment tools. 
 F.  Benefits and Samples of Organizational Assessment 
Tools 
It is clear from the previous reports that acquisition organizations are 
constantly operating under various levels of change. Leadership succession, mission 
requirements, manpower constraints, and structure transformations are just a few 
examples of the types of events prompting change within acquisition organizations. 
Given that human resources play such a vital role in the success of organizations, it 
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workforce’s attitude and perception (Becton & Schraeder, 2009). Moreover, research 
supports the value of assessing the opinions and feelings of individuals relating to  
organizational change (Church, Siegal, Javitch, Waclawski & Burke, 1996). These 
assessments help leaders define areas needing additional change or improvement, 
and they set the stage for more in-depth planning and other efforts to address key 
organizational issues. 
This section will discuss several established assessment tools such as 
Kerzner’s Project Management Maturity Model (PMMM), Project Management 
Institute’s (PMI) Organizational Project Management Maturity Model (OPM3), 
Frame’s Project Management Competence Model, and the Software Engineering 
Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) for Acquisition (CMMI-
ACQ) (Ver. 1.2).  There are a multitude of areas that can be assessed in an 
organization; these samples of assessment tools each provide a unique perspective. 
Areas such as organizational maturity, capabilities and personnel competence are 
addressed by these assessment tools. The final tool to be discussed will be the GAO 
Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies, which is the 
tool this research utilizes to asses TCAQ’s organizational structure and process. 
1.  Kerzner’s Project Management Maturity Model 
In looking at various tools and frameworks for assessing the project-
management function of an organization, Kerzner’s research immediately comes to 
mind. His book Project Management is known as the top reference for the principles 
and concepts of project management. In Kerzner’s 2001 book entitled Strategic 
Planning for Project Management Using a Project Management Maturity Model, he 
outlines a framework for establishing excellence in an organization’s project-
management discipline. 
Kerzner’s Project Management Maturity Model is based on five levels of 
maturity. The five levels are founded on the Project Management Body of 
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internationally recognized project-management industry standard and is based on 
nine knowledge areas:  Integration, Scope, Time, Cost, Quality, Human Resource, 
Communications, Risk, and Procurement.  “[T]he Project Management Maturity 
Model provides the reader with a step-by-step strategy for planning, designing, 
implementing, and improving project management” (Kerzner, 2001, p. xiv). 
Furthermore, the tools that Kerzner provides will tell the reader “how mature” 
the organization actually is from a project-management standpoint and where in the 
model the organization fits. Once it is determined where the organization stands 
against the model, appropriate actions can be taken to increase the level of maturity. 
Kerzner describes the five levels of his Project Management Maturity Model 
as follows: 
Level 1—Common Language 
In this level, the organization recognizes the importance of project 
management and the need for a good understanding of the basic knowledge 
of project management and the accompanying language/terminology. 
(Kerzner, 2001, p. 42) 
Level 2—Common Processes 
In this level, the organization recognizes that common processes need to be 
defined and developed such that successes on one project can be repeated 
on other projects. Also included in this level is the recognition of the 
application and support of the project management principles to other 
methodologies employed by the company. (Kerzner, 2001, p. 42) 
Level 3—Singular Methodology 
In this level, the organization recognizes the synergistic effect of combining all 
corporate methodologies into a singular methodology, the center of which is 
project management. The synergistic effects also make process control 
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Level 4—Benchmarking 
This level contains the recognition that process improvement is necessary to 
maintain a competitive advantage. Benchmarking must be performed on a 
continuous basis. The company must decide whom to benchmark and what to 
benchmark. (Kerzner, 2001, p. 43) 
Level 5—Continuous Improvement 
In this level, the organizations evaluate the information obtained through 
benchmarking, and must then decide whether or not this information will 
enhance the singular methodology. (Kerzner, 2001, p. 43) 
It is important to note that when organizations incorporate this model into their 
own project-management divisions, it is not uncommon to see overlapping of levels 
among different groups. For example, an organization can start benchmarking 
processes while they are continuing to train the workforce. 
Additionally, Kerzner provides a separate customizable assessment tool 
(something any organization can use) for each level of the maturity model in order to 
determine how mature the organization is at each of the five levels. 
The next assessment tool that will be discussed is the Project Management 
Institute’s Organizational Project Management Maturity Model. This model, similar to 
Kerzner’s, provides a baselining tool for organizations to assess various areas. 
2.  Project Management Institute’s Organizational Project 
Management Maturity Model 
PMI’s OPM3 is a tool that assesses and assists program-management 
functions through an organizational project-management maturity model. OPM3 is a 
proprietary, web-based assessment tool available through PMI for purchase. Due to 
the proprietary nature of the tool, this report does not include a detailed analysis of 
the tool but provides a high-level view of the basic premise of OPM3. PMI defines 
organizational project management as “the alignment and systematic management 
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(Hargrove, 2009, Slide 4). OPM3 helps “identify gaps in capabilities that reduce 
business performance,” as well as recommend a strategy for the organization to 
increase “maturity” (Hargrove, 2009, Slide 6). 
The current OPM3 takes into account the user community’s feedback from 
the first edition OPM3. Changes to the second edition of this model include 
 Alignment with PMBOK (4th edition), 
 Alignment with Program Management (2nd edition), 
 Alignment with Portfolio Management (2nd edition), and 
 Self-assessment Method Questions—Improved Architecture. 
Statistics such as “organizations with less developed project management 
capabilities miss budgets by 20% and miss schedules by 40%” are mentioned, as 
well as other project management maturity value statements (Hargrove, 2009, Slide 
7).  The statements and statistics mentioned in the current OPM3 provide the users 
with data on how important it may be to have a mature organizational program-
management function, and they allow users to decide if PMI’s OPM3 is the correct 
tool for their specific needs. 
The next assessment tool that will be discussed is Frame’s Project 
Management Competence Model. This model focuses on project-management 
personnel competence, rather than focusing on the entire organization’s level of 
maturity. 
3.  Frame’s Project Management Competence 
J. Davidson Frame is another well-known authority on the topic of project 
management. He has authored six books and numerous articles as well as served 
as a past Director of Certification for the Project Management Institute. Frame is 
currently a professor of graduate studies in the field of managing projects at the 
University of Management and Technology. His 1999 book entitled Project 
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examples, and suggested improvement methods, as well as assessment tools to 
measure project management competence in three different areas. Frame defines 
competence as “consistently producing desired results” (Frame, 1999, p. 11). 
According to Frame, the three areas of project competence are individual, team, and 
organizational. 
In the area of individual competence, Frame’s research suggests that there 
are typically five “broad categories of project players.” (p. 11) These project players 
include the  project manager, project sponsor, technical personnel, functional 
managers, and support staff. Frame claims that “if any of [the project players] are 
incompetent, the project is in jeopardy” (p. 6). Incompetent in this sense refers to a 
project player lacking the qualification or ability to perform assigned duties. 
The second area that Frame addresses is that of team competence. Frame’s 
research suggests that simply having competent people assigned to a project is not 
the final solution to a successful project outcome. Team competence is needed in 
order to properly align team goals with one central focus. Willingness and the ability 
to work together is at the core of the area of team competence, as well as having the 
proper cross-functional spread of expertise in order to come up with the best 
solutions to problems and challenges. 
The third and final area that Frame addresses is that of organizational 
competence. Frame discusses how organizational competence is the final piece of 
the puzzle when it comes to overall project management competence. Organizations 
that promote collaboration and are “sustaining an infrastructure that offers” (p. 9) 
employees with information to do their jobs effectively are the key attributes of an 
organization possessing the needed competence level in promoting successful 
project management. 
Like Kerzner, Frame provides different assessments for each type of 
competence, based on the PMBOK, that suggest what level of competence the 
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assessments are known, Frame offers suggestions and methods to improve those 
assessment results and achieve a higher level of desired competence, whether it is 
individual, team, organization, or all three. 
The next model to be discussed is the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) 
Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ) (Ver. 1.2). 
TCAQ’s programs primarily consists of Information Technology, and the SEI model 
takes a specific look at how mature an organization is, in the context of software 
acquisition. 
4.  Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model 
Integrated (CMMI) for Acquisition (version 1.2) 
The SEI is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) 
sponsored by the US Department of Defense (Software Engineering Institute, 2007, 
p. 2). The SEI offers solutions to government and industry in the form of several 
capability maturity models that cover a mass of information technology aspects. 
Such areas of SEI expertise include acquisition, security, software development, 
process management, risk, and system design. 
Since information technology acquisition is the preponderance of the 
USTRANSCOM’s acquisition portfolio, this section will focus on the acquisition-
specific CMMI, version 1.2. Figure 3 outlines the basic history of SEI’s various 
capability maturity models and how each are connected through a common 
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Figure 3. History of CMMs CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.2 
(From Software Engineering Institute, 2007) 
In SEI’s CMMI-ACQ framework, best practices from government and private 
industry are combined in order to give the user of the framework a reference of 
information to incorporate into an acquisition organization. The CMMI-ACQ is 
organized into 22 process areas. A process area is described as a “cluster of related 
practices [that], when implemented collectively, satisfies a set of goals considered 
important for making improvement in that area” (Software Engineering Institute, 
2007, p. 22). 
Out of the 22 total areas, 16 are referred to as foundation process areas. 
These areas discuss such topics as process management, project management, 
and support process areas. The remaining six process areas focus on acquisition-
specific topics such as agreement management, acquisition requirements 
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verification, and solicitation and supplier agreement development (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2007, p. 16). The mentioned process areas in the CMMI-ACQ 
only focus on the activities in which the acquirer engages, and it does not include the 
supplier activities. 
The backbones of the CMMI-ACQ model are the components that make up 
the 22 process areas. Within each process area are three categories of components, 
which are meant to improve an organization’s acquisition processes if 
followed/incorporated. The three categories of components are required 
components, expected components, and informative components. 
Required components are described by the CMMI-ACQ as follows: 
Components that describe what an organization must achieve to satisfy a 
process area; an achievement that must be visibly implemented in an 
organization’s processes; CMMI components that are specific and generic 
goals; and goal satisfaction is used in appraisals as the basis for deciding 
whether a process area has been satisfied. (Software Engineering Institute, 
2007, p. 21) 
Expected components are described by the CMMI-ACQ in the following way: 
Expected components describe what an organization may implement to achieve a 
required component; expected components guide those who implement 
improvements or perform appraisals; and the expected components are the specific 
and generic practices (Software Engineering Institute, 2007, p. 21). 
Informative components are described by the CMMI-ACQ in this way: 
Informative components provide details that help organizations understand the 
required and expected components; sub practices, typical work products, goal and 
practice titles, goal and practice notes, examples, and references are all examples of 
informative model components (Software Engineering Institute, 2007, p. 21). 
Figure 4 depicts the relationships between a specific process area and the 








Figure 4. Process Area Relationships, CMMI-ACQ, Version 1.2 
(From Software Engineering Institute, 2007) 
The end goal after using the CMMI-ACQ is to assess what maturity level the 
organization currently falls into and to follow the recommended guidelines in order to 
increase the organization’s level of maturity. The maturity levels follow a scale from 
one to five, with five being at the peak of the scale. The CMMI-ACQ goes into great 
detail on each level of maturity and discusses what requirements must be satisfied in 
order to transition from one level to the next. 
After evaluating each organizational assessment model, our research 
determined that the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at 
Federal Agencies would provide our team with the best tool to analyze TCAQ’s 
acquisition organization.  The GAO’s primary mission is to provide audits and reports 
to Congress on various federal agencies. The next section will discuss the 
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G.  GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at 
Federal Agencies 
In response to the current fiscal demands and challenges that face federal 
agencies, the GAO created a framework to enable high-level, qualitative 
assessments of its acquisition function. This GAO Framework was designed to help 
agency leaders identify areas that require additional attention and provide a basis for 
research. The framework was created via a partnership between the GAO, the 
federal government, and industry experts in human capital, information 
management, financial management and acquisition practices. As seen in Figure 5, 
the GAO Framework consists of four cornerstones: Organizational Alignment and 
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The GAO Framework is organized in a way that each cornerstone is further 
broken down into elements. The elements are, in turn, arranged to address critical 
success factors. For this study, our team utilized the first two cornerstones to 
analyze TCAQ. 
1.  Organizational Alignment and Leadership 
According to the GAO Framework, organizational alignment is the appropriate 
placement of the acquisition function in the organization, with stakeholders having 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Acquisition leadership works hand-in-hand 
with choosing the appropriate organizational alignment. The GAO Framework 
continues by saying that executive leadership is the key to obtaining and maintaining 
organizational support for executing the acquisition function. This cornerstone is 
divided into two elements: (1) Aligning Acquisition with Agency’s Mission and Needs, 
and (2) Commitment from Leadership. 
a.  Aligning Acquisition with Agency’s Mission and Needs 
The Aligning Acquisition with Agency’s Mission and Needs element discusses 
three critical success factors to enable an organization to utilize this cornerstone 
effectively. These critical success factors are assuring appropriate placement of 
acquisition function, organizing the acquisition function to operate strategically, and 
clearly defining and integrating roles and responsibility. TCAQ has recently 
reorganized its acquisition directorate in an attempt to properly align acquisition with 
the mission and needs of the user. For this research, we will only discuss the last 
two factors (organizing the acquisition function to operate strategically and clearly 
defining the integrating roles and responsibility) since the appropriate placement of 
the acquisition function is not in question. 
(1)  Organizing the Acquisition Function to Operate Strategically.  The first 
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operate strategically. The GAO found that leading organizations transform their 
acquisition function from a supporting unit to one that is strategically important to the 
bottom-line success of the organization. The Framework suggests questioning if the 
organization has metrics related to acquisition efficiency and effectiveness. 
According to the GAO, a successful acquisition function’s mission should be well 
defined and its vision, core values, goals and strategies should be consistent with 
the organization’s overall mission. 
(2)  Clearly Defining and Integrating Roles and Responsibilities.  The second 
critical success factor under the cornerstone of aligning acquisition with an agency’s 
missions and needs is clearly defining and integrating roles and responsibilities.  
According to the GAO, effectively meeting an organization’s mission generally 
reflects a consistent, cross-functional and multidisciplinary approach. In addition, the 
GAO Framework suggests looking for cross-functional communication in which 
stakeholders understand other stakeholders’ roles in the acquisition process. Finally, 
the GAO cautions against unresolved conflicts among stakeholders, which can result 
in inefficient operations. 
b.  Commitment from Leadership 
The second element of the cornerstone organizational alignment and 
leadership is commitment from leadership. The GAO recognizes the organizations 
that were noted for their best practices cited leadership as the most important factor 
in providing direction and vision. Commitment from leadership is divided into two 
critical success factors: (1) clear, strong and ethical executive leadership, and (2) 
effective communication and continuous improvement. 
(1)  Clear, Strong and Ethical Executive Leadership.   Having a clear, strong 
and ethical leader unifies an organization to work with a common purpose.  To 
determine if an organization has this type of leadership, the GAO recommends 
asking whether managers at all levels are held accountable for their contributions to 
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organization–wide vision for the acquisition function. The GAO Framework 
recommends several questions to ask when evaluating an acquisition organization. 
The answers to these questions provide an indication of how well an organization is 
positioned for success in the future. 
(2)  Effective Communication and Continuous Improvement.   The final 
critical factor under the element of commitment from leadership is effective 
communication and continuous improvement. The mission, vision and ideals of a 
leader are only as valuable as the leader’s ability to communicate them to his or her 
organization. According to the GAO, leaders should use meaningful metrics to 
measure effectiveness of their communication. The GAO Framework recommends 
that performance measures be used by leaders to gain an understanding of the 
organization’s current level of performance, its processes that need immediate 
attention, its improvement goals, and its results over time. In addition, personnel 
should be asked for their views on the effectiveness of communication and areas for 
improvement throughout the organization. 
2.  Policies and Processes 
The second cornerstone that our team used to analyze TCAQ Acquisition is 
policies and process. The GAO Framework describes policies and processes as the 
basic principles that govern the way an agency performs acquisition functions. 
Effective policies and processes provide guidelines for the personnel in an 
organization.  These policies and processes should be continuously reviewed to 
ensure they are still current and effective based on changes in technology and 
regulations. Organizations with outdated policies and processes suffer from work 
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The cornerstone of policies and processes is divided into three elements: 
planning strategically, effectively managing the acquisition process, and promoting 
successful outcomes of major projects. For this research, our team will focus on the 
element of effectively managing the acquisition process. 
a.  Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process 
Whether an organization is public or private, one constant remains the same: 
it must effectively manage its acquisition process. Given the budget constraints of 
today’s economy, effective management is more important than ever before. This is 
why we decided to concentrate our research on this section of the GAO Framework. 
This element is further separated into four critical success factors: Empowering 
Cross-functional Teams, Managing and Engaging Suppliers, Monitoring and 
Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes, and Enabling Financial 
Accountability. 
(1)  Empowering Cross-functional Teams.  Successful acquisition is only 
accomplished using a variety of disciplines and professional skills found throughout 
an organization. Empowering cross-functional teams allows these professionals the 
freedom to make decisions based on their analysis and experience.  Empowerment 
creates a sense of ownership in the members of a team and enhances their 
investment into the success of the program. The GAO highlights that open, honest 
and clear communication among all the members is a key factor in the success of 
the cross-functional team. 
(2)   Managing and Engaging Suppliers. How well an organization manages 
and engages its suppliers is another critical factor in the success of a program.   The 
GAO Framework states that good relationships with suppliers in acquisition 
organizations can lead to lower costs, higher quality and shorter product design and 
delivery time. One strategy the GAO recommends is to establish and maintain 
effective communication and feedback systems with suppliers. Collaboration 
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if there is an adversarial relationship. According to the article 8 Ways to Build 
Collaborative Teams in the Harvard Business Review, a team’s success or failure at 
collaborating reflects the philosophy of top executives in the organization (Gratton & 
Erickson, 2007). These top executives should implement policies involving an 
organization and its suppliers that lead to win-win situations as much as possible. In 
addition, a successful organization trains its workforce in the skills and nuances of 
managing and engaging suppliers.  Furthermore, the GAO cautions organizations 
not to depend on only one or two key suppliers. Limiting the number of key suppliers 
has the potential to shift the power in the relationship from the organization to the 
suppliers because of the lack of competition.  Finally, the GAO Framework also 
warns about not taking full advantage of suppliers’ intellectual capital, such as 
design or product ideas. 
 (3)  Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes. The 
federal government relies heavily on contractors to complete particular missions. 
This reliance requires effective oversight by a well-trained and competent workforce. 
The GAO Framework questions whether the organization clearly defines the roles 
and responsibilities for those who perform this contract management and oversight.  
The GAO then highlights the Earned Value Management (EVM) method as one way 
to monitor a large project’s cost, schedule and performance. 
(4)  Enabling Financial Accountability. The final critical success factor under 
this element is Enabling Financial Accountability. In these days of decreased 
budgets and increased Congressional oversight, financial accountability must be in 
the forefront of every DoD organization. The GAO poses the question, does the 
acquisition workforce have access to and use timely contractual information to 
monitor and oversee individual acquisitions? The GAO Framework recommends 
investigating whether an organization reports frequently enough (monthly/quarterly) 
to ensure accountability in the acquisition function. Finally, the GAO states that when 
financial data is not useful, timely, or reliable, there is an increased risk of inefficient 
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H.  Summary 
Chapter II provided a comprehensive review of the current literature 
addressing the issues in DoD acquisitions. The chapter discussed the policies and 
procedures that govern the world of the Defense Acquisition System. Then, the 
current state of acquisition in the federal government was examined through a 
sample of relevant reports.  Furthermore, this chapter investigated various 
organization assessment tools and concluded with a review of the GAO Framework 
for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies. Chapter III will discuss 
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III.  USTRANSCOM 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) and its major component organizations. It also provides 
background information on the USTRANSCOM’s acquisition authority. Finally, this 
chapter discusses the organizational structure and program management activities 
of the USTRANSCOM’s Acquisition Command. 
B.  USTRANSCOM 
The mission of the USTRANSCOM is as follows:  develop and direct the Joint 
Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project strategic national security 
capabilities; accurately sense the operating environment; provide end-to-end 
distribution process visibility; and offer responsive support of multinational and non-
governmental logistical requirements that are jointly approved by the US government 
and the Secretary of Defense(USTRANSCOM, 2009a). The Command’s vision is to 
synchronize and deliver unrivaled, full-spectrum, deployment and distribution 
solutions (USTRANSCOM, 2009a). The USTRANSCOM's total wartime capability 
consists of a diverse force: 51,853 active duty; 88,089 reserve and Guard; and 
16,606 civilian personnel. Similarly, the USTRANSCOM relies on its commercial 
partners to meet 88% of continental US land transport, 50% of global air movement, 
and 64% of global sealift (USTRANSCOM, 2009a). The USTRANSCOM currently 
controls a fleet of military assets valued in excess of $52 billion, including 87 ships; 
1,269 aircraft; 2,150 railcars and assorted equipment, and $1.4 billion in 
infrastructure, as well as access through commercial partners to more than 1,001 
aircraft and 360 vessels in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary 
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In 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a single manager for 
deployment and execution called the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) (Webb, 2000).  
The JDA’s mission was to integrate deployment procedures for the different 
Services.  The JDA’s creation was the result of a command post exercise conducted 
in 1978 called  “Nifty Nugget.” Nifty Nugget was the first government-wide 
mobilization exercise that simulated an attack by the Warsaw Pact on the forces of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe. The exercise exposed significant 
issues in the mobilization and deployment plans of the military and civilian 
participants. However, after numerous failed exercises and a limited role in the 
Grenada invasion, it was obvious that the JDA did not have the authority to direct 
each Service to adhere to joint milestones concerning transportation.   The 1986 
Packard Commission report recommended the establishment of a unified 
transportation command. On April 1, 1986, President Ronald Reagan signed 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, creating this unified transportation 
command (USG, 2009, p. 4). 
I also support the recommendation of the Commission that the current 
statutory prohibition on the establishment of a single Unified Command for 
transportation be repealed. Assuming this provision of law will be repealed, 
the Secretary of Defense will take those steps necessary to establish a single 
Unified Command to provide global air, land, and sea transportation. 
(Reagan, 1987) 
The United States Transportation Command was established on April 18, 
1987, by order of President Ronald Reagan (Reagan, 1987). Scott Air Force Base, 
Illinois, was selected as headquarters of the new unified transportation command. 
Scott AFB was the logical choice to allow the USTRANSCOM’s leadership access to 
Military Airlift Command’s expertise in command and control. Air Force General 
Duane H. Cassidy was nominated by President Reagan and was later confirmed by 
the Senate as the first Commander of the USTRANSCOM. 
Originally, the USTRANSCOM’s authority over the different Services’ 
transportation resources was restricted to only wartime situations (Matthews, 1990). 
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Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Operation Desert Shield/Storm marked the first 
major conflict by the United States’ military in which the Commander in Chief 
directing the war had direct contact with only one organization for its transportation 
needs. During this time, the USTRANSCOM moved 504,000 passengers, 3.6 million 
tons of dry cargo, and 6.1 million tons of petroleum products—the equivalent of two 
Army corps, two Marine expeditionary forces, and 28 Air Force tactical fighter 
squadrons (GAO, 1992). 
Following the success of the USTRANSCOM during Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm, senior military leaders recommended that the Command be given the 
same authority during peacetime as it enjoyed during the war. On February 14, 
1992, the USTRANSCOM’s mission was broadened to include the direction of 
transportation resources during both peace and war by DoD Directive 5158.3 (USD 
(AT&L), 2007). The Secretary of Defense gave the USTRANSCOM a new charter: 
“to provide air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, both in 
time of peace and time of war” (USTRANSCOM, 2009a). 
Since Desert Shield/Storm, the USTRANSCOM has continued to prove its 
worth during contingencies such as Desert Thunder (enforcement of UN resolutions 
in Iraq) and Allied Force (NATO operations against Serbia) as well as during 
peacekeeping endeavors—for example, Restore Hope (Somalia), Support Hope 
(Rwanda), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and 
Joint Guardian (Kosovo) (USTRANSCOM, 2009). After the attacks on September 
11, 2001, the USTRANSCOM became a crucial partner in the United States’ Global 
War on Terror. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the 
USTRANSCOM has transported over 2.2 million passengers and approximately 6 
million short tons of cargo (USTRANSCOM, 2009a). 
In September 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander of 
the USTRANSCOM as the DoD Distribution Process Owner (DPO). The DPO 
serves as the single entity to direct and supervise execution of the Strategic 
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gaps between the strategic and theater-level distributions processes, and improve 
the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities—
deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war. The 
consolidation of authority under one process owner is aimed at realizing the 
following logistics efficiencies: 
 Eliminate existing seams between current distribution processes and 
standardize the policies, vision and performance goals in the DoD's 
supply chain; 
 Drive interoperable information-technology solutions and enhance total 
asset visibility to distribution customers;  
 Institutionalize sustainment planning into DoD contingency processes; 
and  
 Streamline distribution accountability under a single combatant 
commander (provide one single accountable person for the combatant 
commander to contact for their distribution needs). 
C.  Components of the USTRANSCOM 
The USTRANSCOM is comprised of three component commands—The Air 
Force’s Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois; the Navy’s Military Sealift 
Command, Washington, DC; and the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command, Alexandria, Virginia. These component commands provide 
intermodal transportation across the spectrum of military operations. 
1.  Air Mobility Command 
Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) mission is to provide global air mobility with 
the right effects, right place, and right time. The Command also plays a crucial role 
in providing humanitarian support at home and around the world. AMC Airmen—
active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and civilians—provide airlift and 
aerial refueling for all of America's armed forces. Many special duty and operational 
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AMC. US forces must be able to provide a rapid, tailored response and have the 
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Rapid global mobility lies at the heart of US strategy in this environment; 
without the capability to project forces, there is no conventional deterrent.  As the 
number of US forces stationed overseas continues to decline, global interests 
remain, making the unique capabilities only AMC can provide even more in demand 
(US Air Force, 2009).  The Command’s vision is Unrivaled Global Reach for 
America—Always (US Air Force, 2009)! AMC has nearly 136,000 active-duty and Air 
Reserve Component military and civilian personnel (US Air Force, 2009). AMC's 
mobility aircraft include the C–5 Galaxy, KC–10 Extender, C–17 Globemaster III, C–
130 Hercules and KC–135 Stratotanker. Operational support aircraft are the VC–25 
(Air Force One), C–9, C–20, C–21, C–32, C–37, C–40 and UH–1 (AMC, 2009). 
Air Mobility Command began on June 1, 1992, when the Military Airlift 
Command and the Strategic Air Command were inactivated and Air Mobility 
Command was formed from elements of these two organizations. AMC melded a 
worldwide airlift system with a tanker force that had been freed from its commitments 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union. AMC has undergone considerable change since 
its establishment.  Focusing on the core mission of strategic air mobility, the 
Command divested itself of infrastructure and forces not directly related to Global 
Reach. The Air Rescue Service, intratheater, aeromedical airlift forces based 
overseas, and much of the operational support airlift fleet were transferred to other 
commands. However, KC–10 and most KC–135 air-refueling aircraft initially 
assigned to Air Combat Command were transferred to AMC, along with Grand Forks 
AFB, McConnell AFB, and Fairchild AFB. 
On October 1, 2003, AMC underwent a major restructuring, bringing a 
warfighting role to its numbered air force. AMC reactivated the 18th AF and 
redesignated its two former numbered air forces as the 15th Expeditionary Mobility 
Task Force (EMTF), with headquarters at Travis AFB, and the 21st EMTF, with 
headquarters at McGuire AFB. AMC's ability to provide global reach is tested daily. 
From providing fuel, supplies, and aeromedical support to troops on the frontline of 
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and earthquake victims both at home and abroad, AMC has been engaged in almost 
nonstop operations since its inception. Command tankers and airlifters have 
supported peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, 
Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti and continue to play a vital role in the 
ongoing Global War on Terrorism.  These many examples of the effective 
application of non-lethal air power indicate that air mobility is a national asset of 
growing importance for responding to emergencies and protecting national interests 
around the globe. 
2.  Military Sealift Command 
Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) mission is to support the US by delivering 
supplies and conducting specialized missions across the world's oceans (US Navy, 
2009). MSC’s vision is to be the leader in innovative and cost-effective maritime 
solutions (US Navy, 2009). 
MSC has a workforce of more than 9,000 people worldwide, about 80% of 
whom serve at sea. More than half of MSC's workforce is made up of civil service 
mariners who are federal employees. The remainder includes commercial mariners, 
civil service personnel ashore, and active-duty and reserve military members. All 
MSC ships, unlike other US Navy ships, are crewed by civilians, and some ships 
also have small military departments assigned to carry out communication and 
supply functions (US Navy, 2009). Military Sealift Command currently operates 112 
non-combatant, civilian-crewed ships worldwide. In addition, the Command has 
access to 53 other ships that are kept in reduced operating status, ready to be 
activated if needed. 
During World War II, four separate government agencies controlled sea 
transportation. In 1949, the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) became the 
single managing agency for the Department of Defense's ocean transportation 
needs. MSTS assumed responsibility for providing sealift and ocean transportation 
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During the Vietnam War, Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was 
renamed Military Sealift Command. Between 1965 and 1969, MSC transported 
nearly 54 million tons of combat equipment and supplies and nearly 8 million tons of 
fuel to Vietnam. MSC ships also transported troops to Vietnam. The Vietnam era 
marked the last use of MSC troop ships. Now, US troops are primarily transported to 
theater by air.  Through the 1970s and 1980s, MSC provided the Department of 
Defense with ocean transportation in support of US deterrent efforts during the Cold 
War years. 
During the first Persian Gulf War's operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm, MSC distinguished itself as the largest source of defense transportation of 
any nation involved. MSC ships delivered more than 12 million tons of wheeled and 
tracked vehicles, helicopters, ammunition, dry cargo, fuel and other supplies and 
equipment during the war. At the height of the war, MSC managed more than 230 
government-owned and -chartered ships. 
Since September 11, 2001, MSC ships have played a vital and continuing 
role in the Global War on Terrorism. As of July 2008, MSC ships had delivered more 
than 12 billion gallons of fuel and had moved 100 million square feet of combat 
equipment and supplies to US and coalition forces engaged in operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (US Navy, 2009). 
3.  Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command 
The mission of Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is to 
provide global surface deployment and distribution services to meet the nation’s 
objectives (US Army, 2009). Its vision is to provide tailored and agile capability and 
sustainment solutions that meet the warfighters’ requirements (US Army, 2009). 
The SDDC has a workforce of more than 4,600 people worldwide.  
Approximately 57% of SDDC's workforce is made up of Guard and Reserve 
personnel while the remainder is comprised of active-duty and federal civilians (US 
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coordinates and leverages the capability of the commercial transportation industry 
and other military assets to create an efficient flow of materials worldwide. The 
SDDC has 24 port terminal units spread throughout the continental United States 
and the world (US Army, 2009). 
The SDDC traces its organizational lineage to the Army's former Office of the 
Chief of Transportation, established July 31, 1942. Fourteen years later, the 
Department of Defense established a separate agency to carry out traffic 
management functions.  On May 1, 1956, SDDC’s original mandate began when the 
Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the single manager 
for military traffic within the United States. To execute this centralized management 
concept, a joint-Service planning staff was formed to establish an agency, the 
Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS). The DoD then formally 
activated MTMTS as a jointly staffed Army major command on February 15, 1965. 
MTMTS assumed all responsibilities assigned to the Defense Traffic Management 
Service and the terminal operations functions of the US Army Supply and 
Maintenance Command (a component of the Army Materiel Command). 
With the approval and publication of its single-manager charter on June 24, 
1965, MTMTS joined the Military Air Transport Service (now Air Mobility Command) 
and the Military Sea Transport Service (now Military Sealift Command) in providing 
complete transportation services to the Department of Defense. On October 1, 1988, 
MTMTS, along with the Military Sealift Command and the Military Airlift Command, 
officially became components of the United States Transportation Command. 
During 2001 and throughout 2002, MTMC mobilized Reserve Transportation 
units and organized Deployment Support Teams as part of its support for the Global 
War on Terrorism. From October 2002–May 2003, the Command supported 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, moving over 15,000,000 square 
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With the USTRANSCOM’s designation as the DoD’s Joint Distribution 
Process Owner in the fall of 2003 and as a result of MTMC’s changed missions to 
meet the demands of the Global War on Terror, the Command changed its name 
officially on January 1, 2004, to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution 
Command.  The name change better reflects its increased emphasis on deployment 
operations and end-to-end distribution of surface cargoes from depots to the 
warfighters (US Army, 2009). 
D.  Acquisition Authority 
The USTRANSCOM was authorized to procure commercial transportation 
when it was established in 1987. However, to do so, USTRANSCOM first needed a 
delegation of authority from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The 
USTRANSCOM did not seek such a delegation at that time and, instead, executed 
the acquisition mission through its components: AMC, MSC, and SDDC. 
AMC was tasked with procuring airlift services from commercial air carriers.  
AMC also manages the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF is a DoD 
program designed to award industry with peacetime business for wartime 
commitment. In addition, AMC establishes contracts with other charter airlift and 
express services such as Federal Express and United Parcel Service. 
MSC procures sealift services for the USTRANSCOM. MSC’s contracts 
include long-term charters for dry cargo ships to support the peacetime mission. 
Additionally, MSC provides access to short-term voyage charters to support 
exercises and emergency situations. 
SDDC is in charge of procuring the movement of containerized cargo 
worldwide to include sealift and land surface movement. SDDC utilized a program 
called the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). The VISA program 
awards the DoD’s peacetime business to industry based on a carrier’s level of 
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Following its designation as the DPO in 2003, the USTRANSCOM 
determined that it needed the authority to establish its own acquisition capability that 
could be dedicated to DPO requirements and requested the delegation of authority. 
Appendix 1 is the letter from Major General William H. Johnson announcing the 
delegation of “head of agency” to the commander of the USTRANSCOM. According 
to the FAR, head of agency or “agency head” means the secretary, attorney general, 
administrator, governor, chairperson, or other chief official of an executive agency, 
unless otherwise indicated, including any deputy or assistant chief official of an 
executive agency (GSA, 2009). 
In response to receiving head-of-agency authority, the USTRANSCOM 
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E.  USTRANSCOM’s Command Acquisition 
The USTRANSCOM is organized into 11 entities with all acquisition-related 
functions falling under Transportation Command Acquisition (TCAQ). TCAQ’s 
mission is to serve as the business advisor to and external liaison with AMC, MSC, 
SDDC, acquisition components, and other contracting agencies. TCAQ provides 
expertise on various acquisition policies, procedures, and strategies to DoD 
organizations, federal agencies, and the commercial transportation industry. TCAQ 
analyzes and proposes acquisition-related legislative and regulatory changes to 
increase the effectiveness of the Defense Transportation System (DTS). TCAQ also 
ensures compliance with these regulations. TCAQ serves as the focal point for the 
USTRANSCOM acquisition by managing the Command's internal acquisition and 
contracting process. Additionally, the acquisition chief chairs both the Defense 
Acquisition Regulation (DAR) Council Transportation Committee and the Acquisition 
Strategy Review Panel (ASRP) (USTRANSCOM, 2009b). 
In 2009, TCAQ changed its organizational structure to include program 
management. The new structure consists of two major sections and seven divisions 
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Figure 7. TCAQ Command Structure 
(From USTRANSCOM, 2009b) 
 
The contracting section of TCAQ is responsible for contracting oversight and 
administration of all USTRANSCOM programs. 
Acquisition Policy and Ops (TCAQ-P) provides expertise on acquisition 
policies, procedures, and strategies across the DPO. TCAQ-P ensures the 
USTRANSCOM maintains the highest ethical procurement standards while 
achieving global warfighting support. 
Specialized Services (TCAQ-S) provides contracting support for the 
USTRANSCOM’s acquisition of both specialized services and Research 
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National Transportation (TCAQ-R) provides responsive acquisition and 
business advisory support for national and regional transportation programs serving 
DoD customers worldwide. 
International Scheduled Services (TCAQ-I) acts as a business advisor and 
procurement of international multi-model transportation services in support of the 
DoD’s peace and wartime movement of cargo and passengers worldwide. 
DPO Support (TCAQ-D) provides responsive contracting and business advice 
for USTRANSCOM DPO support services as well as contracting support for SDDC 
National Level’s transportation system requirements. 
The program management section of TCAQ is responsible for planning, 
managing, developing and delivering USTRANSCOM-validated IT and services 
programs. In addition, the program management section focuses on delivering 
capabilities to the customers while ensuring programs are executed in accordance 
with law, regulation, etc. 
IT division (TCAQ-T) provides oversight for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Surveillance (C4S) programs. 
Services division (TCAQ-M) provides expertise on acquisition program 
management policies, procedures and strategies to the USTRANSCOM 
Commander, staff and components. In addition, TCAQ-M manages ACAT and high-
visibility services programs. 
The program management section works closely with the program support 
branch (TCJ6-P). TCJ6-P is the single point for program resource management. In 
addition to building and coordinating program budgets, TCJ6-P supports TCAQ-T/M 
through integrated management plans and ensuring policy compliance. Figure 8 
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F.  Summary 
This chapter described the organizational history of the USTRANSCOM, its 
major components and its Acquisition Command. Furthermore, it explained 
acquisition authority and the significance of the USTRANSCOM receiving head-of-
agency power.  Finally, this chapter detailed the USTRANSCOM’s Acquisition 
Command and its major sections. Chapter IV will discuss the results of the web-
based survey as well as an analysis based on the GAO Framework for Assessing 
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IV.  Analysis of Research 
A.  Overview 
This chapter contains findings from the surveys and semi-structured 
interviews obtained from TCAQ personnel. The survey and interview questions were 
designed to provide feedback on the elements of Cornerstone 1 and Cornerstone 2 
that are outlined in the GAO Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at 
Federal Agencies. As shown in Figure 9, the GAO has assigned critical success 
factors to each element designed to enable an organization to address specific 
areas needing improvement. For example, when it comes to alignment of acquisition 
with an agency’s mission and needs (element), one critical success factor is to 
ensure that acquisition roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and integrated 
within the organization. 
Cornerstone 1 Elements Critical Success Factors: 
Aligning Acquisition with 
Agency’s Missions and Needs 
 Organizing the Acquisition Function to 
Operate Strategically 
 Clearly Defining and Integrating Roles 
and Responsibilities 
Commitment from Leadership  Clear, Strong and Ethical Executive 
Leadership 





Cornerstone 2 Elements Critical Success Factors: 
Effectively Managing the 
Acquisition Process 
 Empowering Cross-functional Teams 
 Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
 Monitoring and Providing Oversight to 
Achieve Desired Outcomes 
 Enabling Financial Accountability 
 
Figure 9. Cornerstone 2 Elements: Critical Success Factors 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 61 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Figure 10 provides the cornerstone, element, and critical success factor 
addressed by each survey question. 
Question 
Number: 
Cornerstone: Element: Critical Success 
Factor: 
1, 27, 37, 50, 57 
Total Questions: 5 N/A (Info Gathering) N/A N/A 
2–7 
Total Questions: 6 
Organizational Alignment & 
Leadership 
Aligning ACQ with 
Agency’s Mission and 
Needs 
Organizing the 
Acquisition Function to 
Operate Strategically 
8–10 
Total Questions: 3 
 
Organizational Alignment & 
Leadership 
Aligning ACQ with 
Agency’s Mission and 
Needs 
Clearly Defining and 
Integrating Roles and 
Responsibilities 
11–14 
Total Questions: 4 








Total Questions: 2 









Total Questions: 10 Policies & Processes 
Effectively 





Total Questions: 10 Policies & Processes 
Effectively 





Total Questions: 12 Policies & Processes 
Effectively 




to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes 
51–55 
Total Questions: 5 Policies & Processes 
Effectively 





Figure 10. Survey Question Details by Corresponding Element &  
Critical Success Factor 
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with TCAQ personnel. The 
information gathered from the interviews was used to provide backup data to the 
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B.  Setup, Demographics, and Analysis Methodology 
The survey statements were derived from the GAO Framework for Assessing 
the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies. It was then fielded utilizing an internet 
company that specializes in web-based surveys—www.surveymonkey.com. The 
survey was available to TCAQ personnel from August 1, 2009, through August 31, 
2009. Survey-takers were sent an e-mail from Ms. Gail Jorgenson (Deputy Director 
TCAQ) that provided an internet hyperlink to the survey. Upon opening the hyperlink, 
respondents were required to view and accept an informed consent form. The 
consent form outlined the procedures, risks, benefits, compensation, confidentiality 
and privacy, voluntary nature of the study, points of contact, and statement of 
consent of the survey. 
The demographics included 19 survey responses out of 40 personnel that 
received the survey, resulting in a 47.5% response rate. Of the survey responses, 
58.3% of respondents were most closely associated with program management. 
Next, 33.3% of respondents were most closely associated with contracting. Then, 
4.2% of respondents were most closely associated with finance. Finally, 4.2% fell 
into the “other” category.  The one person that fell in the “other” category works in a 
computer support function.  For this research project, all survey responses were 
assessed collectively; answers to the survey questions were not broken down by job 
function. 
The survey results that follow are based on a majority percentage method in 
which it was determined if the overall majority at least “agree” (“definitely agree” or 
“agree”) versus at least “disagree” (“definitely disagree” or “disagree”). However, if 
the majority percentage of survey responses fell under the “neither” category, then 
the results were determined to be “inconclusive.” Based on this methodology, each 
survey question was analyzed to determine the majority proportion of responses. 
Using the GAO Framework as a guide to identify potential areas of caution, our 
research will utilize the terms “negative response” or “positive response.” Depending 
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“disagree” constituted a negative or positive response. The largest proportion of 
summed responses determined whether the overall response to a question was 
positive, negative, or inconclusive. For example, if it was determined that “definitely 
disagree” and “disagree” constituted a negative response, then the sum of the 
responses for “definitely disagree” and “disagree” were proportionally greater 
compared to the number of responses for “neither” and the sum of the responses for 
“definitely agree” and “agree.” For a statement with a majority of negative responses, 
this was considered an area of concern and cautions were provided, as outlined in 
the GAO Framework.   
The results that follow will first address the elements and critical success 
factors within Cornerstone 1 of the GAO Framework, Organizational Alignment and 
Leadership.  Next, elements and critical success factors for Cornerstone 2, Policies 
and Processes, will be addressed. 
C.  Cornerstone 1 Results 
1.  Organizing the Acquisition Function to Operate Strategically 
The element Aligning Acquisition with the Agencies Mission and Needs was 
addressed early in the survey by questions 2–7. This element is extremely 
appropriate considering the recent reorganization of TCAQ in order to better align its 
program management function. The critical success factor that applies to this 
element is Organizing the Acquisition Function to Operate Strategically. In order to 
capture the effects of the reorganization, the survey began by collecting information 
related to recent changes experienced by TCAQ personnel. Survey question 2 
states:  “My organization has experienced significant changes in its mission, since 
the reorganization of USTRANSCOM Acquisition.” The overall responses to this 
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According to TCAQ personnel, 68.4% definitely agreed or agreed that the 
organization had experienced significant changes to its mission since the 
reorganization while 15.8% disagreed. Survey question 3 addressed changes to 
TCAQ’s budget.  A majority of personnel neither agreed nor disagreed that there 
have been significant changes to the budget; and consequently, the results for this 
question were inconclusive.  One feedback comment that helps explain this 
response is, “There have been budget perturbations, but only changes in ownership, 
not major changes in amounts for most programs.” Survey questions 4 and 5 asked 
TCAQ personnel to rate change with a focus on workforce and technology, 
respectively. Similar to question 2, a majority of personnel reported that significant 
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Questions 6 and 7 addressed the mechanisms and metrics established by the 
organization in response to changing conditions. Question 6 states: “My organization 
has mechanisms to anticipate, identify, and react to risks presented by changes in 
conditions that can affect acquisition related goals.” The overall responses to this 
question are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Results of Survey Question 6 
 
As shown in Table 3, there was a negative response to question 6 with 44.5% 
of TCAQ personnel disagreeing that the organization has mechanisms in place to 
anticipate, identify and react to risks presented by changes in conditions while 
38.9% definitely agreed or agreed. Survey question 7 stated “My organization has 
metrics related to acquisition efficiency, effectiveness, and results that are included 
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and management.” The responses to this question were also negative. Similar to the 
responses to survey question 6, 44.5% of personnel disagreed that the organization 
has metrics in place that are communicated regularly to senior leaders and 
management. 
2.  Clearly Defining and Integrating Roles and Responsibilities 
Survey questions 8–10 apply to the same element as questions 2–7; 
however, they address the critical success factor of Clearly Defining and Integrating 
Roles and Responsibilities. Survey question 8 states: “The roles and responsibilities 
of stakeholders in the acquisition process are well-defined.” For this question, 
“stakeholders” includes TCAQ acquisition personnel, end users and service/IT 
contractors. The overall responses to this question are shown in Table 4. 
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As shown in Table 4, there was a negative overall response to this question 
with 47.4% of TCAQ personnel disagreeing that the roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders are well defined while 36.8% agreed. The GAO Framework cautions 
organizations when the acquisition stakeholder’s roles are unclear. When it comes to 
stakeholders, one survey respondent offered feedback that shed some light on well-
defined roles and responsibilities: “USTRANSCOM has regulations/instructions that 
have conflicting guidance regarding roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the 
acquisition process.” Survey question 9 addressed leadership empowering 
stakeholders in the acquisition function.  The results for this survey question were 
inconclusive with 42.1% of responses as neither agree nor disagree. Finally, survey 
question 10 asked if stakeholders are held accountable for their actions. The 
majority of TCAQ personnel agreed that leadership does hold stakeholders 
accountable for their actions. 
3.  Clear, Strong, and Ethical Executive Leadership 
The next critical success factor addressed by the survey is Clear, Strong and 
Ethical Executive Leadership. Survey question 11 states: “Senior leadership 
communicates strategic, integrated, and organization-wide vision for the acquisition 
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Table 5. Results of Survey Question 11 
 
As shown in Table 5, there was a positive overall response to this question 
with 47.4% of TCAQ personnel agreeing that senior leadership communicates 
strategic, integrated, and organization-wide vision for the acquisition function while 
21.1% disagreed. Similarly, survey question 12 asked TCAQ personnel if they felt 
that leadership effectively communicates the organization’s missions, values, and 
guiding principles to the workforce. The total positive response was 42.1% definitely 
agree and agree while 21.1% definitely disagree and disagree. Interviews with 
TCAQ personnel highlighted the benefits of organization-wide “Director’s Calls” that 
allowed leadership an opportunity to directly communicate their vision to the 
workforce. Survey question 13 received a high positive rating by TCAQ personnel in 
response to: “I feel leadership and management has a positive and supportive 
attitude toward the organization’s workforce.” The total positive response was 63.1% 
definitely agree and agree while only 10.6% definitely disagree and disagree. The 
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accountable for their contribution to the acquisition process. Like survey question 13, 
question 14 received a positive response from TCAQ personnel. The total positive 
response was 68.5% definitely agree and agree while only 26.4% definitely disagree 
and disagree. 
4.  Effective Communications and Continuous Improvement 
Survey questions 15 and 16 were utilized to examine the critical success 
factor of “Effective Communications and Continuous Improvement.” While leadership 
had positive ratings for its ability to communicate the organization’s mission and its 
vision, this section highlighted a negative trend with regard to two-way 
communication. Survey question 15 states: “I have been asked for my view on the 
effectiveness of this (organization’s) communication.” The total negative response 
was 42.1% definitely disagree and disagree while 26.3% definitely agree and agree. 
One comment from the survey stated, “Senior leadership does not communicate 
with support personnel.”  Likewise, 42.1% of TCAQ personnel definitely disagree 
and disagree that stakeholders have been asked for their views on the effectiveness 
of the existing acquisition process and areas needing improvement while 31.6% 
agreed. Interviews with TCAQ personnel revealed a concern that leadership does 
not value the workforce’s opinion about the effectiveness of—and ways to improve—
the existing acquisition process. 
D.  Cornerstone 2 Results 
1.  Empowering Cross-functional Teams 
Cornerstone 2 of the Framework discusses Policies and Processes. The first 
critical success factor under this cornerstone is “Empowering Cross-functional 
Teams,” which is addressed in survey questions 17–26. TCAQ personnel were 
asked the following survey question: My organization uses cross-functional teams in 
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As shown in Table 6, there was a high, positive overall response to this 
question, with 94.7% of TCAQ personnel agreeing that their organization uses 
cross-functional teams while 0% disagreed. The Framework comments that most 
leading organizations make extensive use of cross-functional teams in order to make 
sure they have the right mix of knowledge, technical expertise and creditability. The 
majority of TCAQ personnel agreed that they felt empowered to make decisions 
about a program’s outcomes. This is a positive sign according to the Framework, 
which encourages organizations to empower their workforce to make decisions and 
become invested in a project’s outcome. Survey questions 19–22 all asked TCAQ 
personnel about the use of project plans and performance measurement baselines 
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response. Survey question 23 asked TCAQ personnel if they involved individuals 
outside of the project team to regularly review the status of cost, schedule and 
performance goals. There was a positive overall response to this question with 
47.3% of TCAQ personnel agreeing that they involve individuals outside of the 
project team in reviewing project goals while 21.1% disagreed.  Survey question 24 
produced an interesting response, as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Results of Survey Question 24 
 
 
As shown in Table 7, there was a negative overall response to this question 
with 36.9% of TCAQ personnel disagreeing that there are incentives in place to 
encourage their team to meet project goals while 26.3% agreed. Interviews with 
TCAQ personnel revealed that while there was continuous pressure from leadership 
to meet project goals, there were very few incentives to reward hard work. One 
interviewee stated “it’s an incentive to keep your feet out of the fire.” The Framework 
cautions organizations that fail to use good project management techniques, which 
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concluded on a positive trend with TCAQ personnel agreeing with survey questions 
25 and 26. Survey question 25 asked if teams were held accountable for meeting 
cost, schedule, and performance goals to which 63.2% agreed. Survey question 26 
discussed if there was open, honest, and clear communication among all the project 
stakeholders. Over 80% of survey-takers agreed that this type of communication 
existed among all of the project stakeholders. 
2.  Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
The second critical success factor is Managing and Engaging Suppliers, 
which is addressed in survey questions 28–36. According to the Framework, leading 
organizations have found that more cooperative business relationships with 
suppliers have improved their ability to respond to changing business conditions 
(GAO, 2005b, p. 17). Survey question 28 opens this section by asking whether 
survey-takers agreed with this statement: “My organization has a process to identify 
key contractors and subcontractors.” The majority of survey-takers agreed that 
TCAQ does have processes in place. Survey question 29 goes deeper into this 
subject. It reads: “My organization uses a rigorous contractor selection process to 
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Table 8. Results of Survey Question 29 
 
 
As shown in Table 8, there was a positive overall response to this question 
with 57.9% of TCAQ personnel agreeing that TCAQ uses a rigorous contractor 
selection process while 21.1% disagreed. The Framework highlights the importance 
of using stringent supplier-selection criteria while maintaining competition among 
suppliers.  Survey questions 30 through 33 touch on the subject of utilizing strategic 
purchasing managers for key goods and services. The results of these questions all 
fell within the “neither” category and are therefore reported as inconclusive. 
Interviews with TCAQ personnel shed some light on these results by explaining that 
they currently don’t have the manpower to have dedicated strategic purchasing 
managers. Survey question 34 asks if TCAQ provides training to its acquisition 
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agreed that there was training available on this subject. The next question discusses 
if the organization has an established and effective feedback system with its 
suppliers. There was a positive overall response to this question with 57.9% of 
TCAQ personnel agreed that a supplier feedback system was in place while 5.3% 
disagreed. The Framework highlights many types of feedback systems available to 
organizations such as providing periodic “report cards” and meeting formally with 
key suppliers to discuss issues; the Framework also suggests  using surveys, 
supplier meetings, and formal agency-supplier councils or supplier advisory councils 
to assess existing customer-supplier working arrangements, identify problem areas, 
and report back to suppliers (GAO, 2005b, p. 18). The final question in this section 
asked: “My organization fosters an environment in which its suppliers (contractors) 
invest their intellectual capital—their ideas—into the venture.” Survey-takers agreed 
with this statement and commented that there was a strong partnership relationship 
between the organization and its suppliers. 
3.  Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes 
Survey questions 38 through 49 address the third critical success factor of 
Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes. The Framework 
discusses the recent trend of the government’s increased use of contractors to carry 
out its mission. As a result, organizations require effective oversight processes and 
staff with the right skills and training to ensure contractors provide the needed goods 
and services.  The majority of TCAQ personnel agreed with survey question 38, 
which asked:  “My organization tracks the type of acquisition methods used for 
acquiring goods and services to assess workload and training requirements.” This is 
an important area of concern due to the manpower constants that currently exist 
within TCAQ. Survey question 39 states, “My organization has processes and 
controls in place to ensure effective oversight of supplier performance.” The results 
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Table 9. Results of Survey Question 39 
 
As shown in Table 9, there was a high, positive overall response to this 
question with 89.5% of TCAQ personnel agreeing that there are processes in place 
to ensure oversight of supplier performance while 10.6% disagreed. Likewise, there 
was a high, positive overall response to survey question 40, which asked if the 
organization clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of those who perform 
contract management and oversight. Training is a force multiplier in the fight to 
oversee suppliers’ performance.  Survey questions 41 and 42 ask if the organization 
has taken actions to ensure that it has the adequate staff with the right training to 
oversee suppliers and the overall acquisition process. Over 60% of survey-takers 
agreed that the organization had provided the right people with the right training and 
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process on a continuous basis. Survey question 43 discusses the use of earned 
value-management (EVM) within TCAQ. The results of this question were 
inconclusive with 52.6% answering neither agree nor disagree. However, one 
comment from the interviews stated that “our organization avoids EVM.” The 
Framework cautions when earned-value data are unavailable or unreliable, and 
earned-value management principles are not properly implemented. The next survey 
question in this section asks if the organization monitors the effectiveness of the 
acquisition policies and processes. There was a positive overall response to this 
question with 57.9% of survey-takers agreeing that TCAQ does monitor the 
effectiveness of acquisition policies and processes while 21.1% disagreed. The 
Framework suggests that organizations complete a cost-benefit analysis when 
considering alternative policies and processes and follow up on findings identified in 
monitoring efforts (GAO, 2005b, p. 20). Survey question 45 states: “My organization 
completes a cost benefit analysis when considering alternative policies and 
processes.” The results of question 45 are shown in Table10. 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 77 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
There was a positive overall response to this question with 73.7% of survey-
takers agreeing that TCAQ does use cost-benefit analysis while 21.1% disagreed. 
Survey questions 46 through 49 asked TCAQ personnel if a significant (>50%) 
number of contracts fail to meet cost, schedule, performance or quality 
requirements. The Framework cautions against organizations that do not monitor 
whether their contracts meet cost, schedule, performance, and quality requirements. 
According to survey-takers, TCAQ does monitor these requirements and does not 
have a significant number of contracts fail to meet cost, schedule, performance or 
quality requirements, which is a positive trend. 
4.  Enabling Financial Accountability 
The final critical success factor is Enabling Financial Accountability. Survey 
questions 51–56 cover this section. The GAO Framework suggests, throughout the 
acquisition process, financial information should be tracked and communicated in a 
way that enables effective evaluation and assessment of acquisition activities. When 
financial data are not useful, relevant, timely, or reliable, the acquisition function—as 
well as other functions across an organization—are at risk of inefficient or wasteful 
business practices (GAO, 2005b, p. 20). Survey question 51 states: “Our acquisition 
force has access to, and uses, timely contractual financial information to monitor and 
oversee individual acquisitions.” Over 50% of survey-takers agreed with this 
statement. There was an interesting result from survey question 52, which stated: 
“My organization’s financial management system integrates with the contract 
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Table 11. Results of Survey Question 52 
 
 
As shown in Table 11, there was a negative overall response to this question 
with 52.6% of TCAQ personnel disagreeing that the financial management system 
integrates with the contract management system while 15.8% agreed. Moreover, 
one interviewee stated, “it takes alot [sic] of different systems to track financial data 
which makes the job time consuming.” Survey question 53 continues on the subject 
of how well the TCAQ financial system integrates with their acquisition process. 
Survey-takers were asked if they agreed that the financial system reports frequently 
enough to provide reasonable assurance of accountability. There was a slight 
positive response to this survey question with 36.8% agreeing and 31.6% 
disagreeing. Survey-takers agreed that financial data resulting from new contracts, 
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an inconclusive response to survey question 55, which asked: “My organization 
measures how often erroneous or improper payments are made.”  Over 50% 
responded that they neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.  However, 
one comment that was made during the interviews stated, “Contract administration 
suffers from inadequate staffing levels, lack of 1102 experience, and competing 
priorities.” The GAO Framework cautions organizations against inadequate 
transaction processing, particularly improper payments from occurring.. The final 
survey question in this section asks if the survey-takers agreed that the organization 
takes appropriate corrective action when the contractor is not meeting expectations 
for cost, schedule or performance. The results of this question are shown in Table 
12. 
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As shown in Table 12, there was a positive overall response to this question 
with 57.9% of survey-takers agreeing that TCAQ takes appropriate corrective action 
when the contractor is not meeting expectations for cost, schedule or performance 
while 10.5% disagreed. Taking appropriate corrective action when the contractor is 
not meeting contract requirements is an important step to ensure that TCAQ is 
maximizing the limited budgets of its customers. The next section will provide 
analysis of the results from the survey given to TCAQ personnel. 
E.  Analysis of Results 
The analysis of results will be divided into three elements: Aligning Acquisition 
with Agency’s Mission and Needs, Commitment from Leadership, and Effectively 
Managing the Acquisition Process. Each element is integral to effective stewardship 
at an organization and depends on critical success factors. The presence of critical 
success factors—which focus on program results and mission accomplishment—can 
enhance the likelihood of consistently achieving desired acquisition outcomes. 
Conversely, the absence of these critical success factors can point to areas 
embodying high degrees of risk or those needing greater attention from leadership 
(GAO, 2005b, p. ix). 
1.  Aligning Acquisition with Agency’s Mission and Needs 
The element Aligning Acquisition with the Agency’s Mission and Needs was 
addressed in the survey by questions 2–10. The critical success factors for this 
element were: Organizing the Acquisition Function to Operate Strategically and 
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a.  Organizing the Acquisition Function to Operate 
Strategically 
There was a positive response from survey–takers, recognizing that changes 
in mission, workforce and technology had occurred. The results were inconclusive 
on budget changes; however, one feedback comment that helps explain this 
response was the following:  “There have been budget perturbations, but only 
changes in ownership, not major changes in amounts for most programs.” 
Two areas of concern revealed from the survey were the lack of metrics 
related to acquisition effectiveness and the absence of mechanisms to anticipate, 
identify, and react to changes that affect acquisition goals. According to the GAO in 
their 2009 study Defense Acquisitions Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon 
Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines, “Program outcome metrics—
quantitative measures of cost, schedule, and performance over time—provide useful 
indicators of the health of acquisition programs and whether they are meeting their 
intended goals” (GAO, 2009b, p. 1). 
Without effective metrics and mechanisms, an organization is forced to plan 
at the tactical level and react to changes as they occur. This tactical planning is 
inconsistent with the first critical success factor, Organizing the Acquisition Function 
to Operate Strategically, and indicates an area needing greater attention from 
leadership. 
b.  Clearly Defining and Integrating Roles and Responsibilities 
Likewise, the survey results indicate inconsistency with respect to the second 
critical success factor, Clearly Defining and Integrating Roles and Responsibilities. 
An area of concern was the negative response to the roles and responsibilities of 
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being held accountable for their actions. One survey feedback write-up that shed 
some light on this subject was the following: “USTRANSCOM has 
regulations/instructions that have conflicting guidance regarding roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in the acquisition process.” These results highlight a 
potential area of concern when stakeholders are held responsible for their actions 
yet their roles and responsibilities are not clear. 
2.  Commitment from Leadership 
The element Commitment from Leadership was addressed in the survey by 
questions 11–16. The critical success factors for this element were Clear, Strong, 
and Ethical Executive Leadership and Effective Communications and Continuous 
Improvement. 
a.  Clear, Strong and Ethical Executive Leadership 
There was a positive response to leadership communicating strategic, 
integrated, and organization-wide vision, mission, values, and guiding principles. 
Survey-takers also agreed that leadership has a positive and supporting attitude 
toward the organization’s workforce. Interviews with TCAQ personnel highlighted the 
benefits of organization-wide “Director’s Calls” that allowed leadership an 
opportunity to directly communicate their vision to the workforce. These positive 
responses indicate actions that are consistent with the critical success factor, Clear, 
Strong, and Ethical Executive Leadership. 
b.  Effective Communications and Continuous Improvement 
However, while leadership had positive ratings for their ability to communicate 
the organization’s mission and its vision, this section also highlighted a negative 
trend with regard to two-way communication. One comment from the survey stated, 
“Senior leadership does not communicate with support personnel.” Interviews with 
TCAQ personnel also revealed a concern that leadership does not value the 
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acquisition process. These results indicate an area of concern and are inconsistent 
with respect to the second critical success factor, Effective Communications and 
Continuous Improvement. 
3.  Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process 
The element Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process was addressed in 
the survey by questions 17–56. The critical success factors for this element were:  
Empowering Cross-functional Teams, Managing and Engaging Suppliers, Monitoring 
and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes, and Enabling Financial 
Accountability. 
a.  Empowering Cross-functional Teams 
The first critical success factor we will address is, Empowering Cross-
functional Teams. The GAO Framework comments that most leading organizations 
make extensive use of cross-functional teams in order to make sure they have the 
right mix of knowledge, technical expertise and creditability (GAO, 2005b, p. 16). 
There were positive responses to survey questions regarding the use of cross-
functional teams. 
In addition, survey-takers agreed that they felt empowered by leaders to 
make decisions about their programs. This is a positive sign according to the 
Framework, which encourages organizations to empower their workforce to make 
decisions and become invested in a project’s outcome. 
However, there was a negative response to the survey question regarding 
incentives in place to encourage teams to meet project goals. Interviews with TCAQ 
personnel revealed that while there was continuous pressure from leadership to 
meet project goals there were very few incentives to reward hard work. One 
interviewee stated, “it’s an incentive to keep your feet out of the fire.” The 
Framework cautions organizations that fail to use good project management 
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responses indicate practices that are consistent with the critical success factor, 
Empowering Cross-functional Teams but also identify incentives as an area needing 
greater attention from leadership. 
b.  Managing and Engaging Suppliers 
According to the GAO Framework, leading organizations have found that 
more cooperative business relationships with suppliers have improved their ability to 
respond to changing business conditions (GAO, 2005b, p. 17). The survey results 
indicated a positive response to TCAQ using a process to identify key suppliers as 
well as providing training on managing supplier relationships. 
Furthermore, the GAO Framework highlights many types of feedback 
systems available to organizations such as meeting formally with key suppliers to 
discuss issues or supplier advisory councils to assess existing customer-supplier 
working arrangements, identify problem areas, and report back to suppliers (GAO, 
2005b, p. 18).  Respondents also had a positive response to survey questions about 
the effectiveness of TCAQ’s use of supplier feedback systems. These positive 
responses indicate actions that are consistent with the critical success factor 
Managing and Engaging Suppliers. 
c.  Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired 
Outcomes 
The GAO Framework discusses the recent trend of the government’s 
increased use of contractors to carry out its mission (GAO, 2005b, p. 19). As a 
result, organizations require effective oversight processes and staff with the right 
skills and training to ensure contractors provide the needed goods and services. 
This is an important area of interest because of the manpower constants that 
currently exist within TCAQ. Survey-takers had a positive response that TCAQ has 
processes and controls in place to ensure effective oversight of supplier 
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oversight of supplier performance and a clear understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities of contract management. 
The GAO Framework suggests that organizations complete a cost-benefit 
analysis when considering alternative policies and processes and follow up on 
findings identified in monitoring efforts (GAO, 2005b, p. 20). Respondents agreed 
that TCAQ utilized cost-benefit analysis in addition to monitoring whether its 
contracts meet cost, schedule, performance, and quality requirements. 
Finally, the GAO Framework also highlights that an organization’s suppliers 
should have established earned-value management (EVM) systems, and that the 
organization verifies that it and its suppliers effectively implement earned-value 
management processes and procedures on all applicable programs. Survey-takers 
responses were inconclusive when asked about the use of EVM. Further research 
determined that TCAQ only had one program that utilized EVM with two more 
starting within the next year. The lack of programs that were applicable to EVM 
explains why survey-takers’ responses were inconclusive. The overall positive 
responses indicate practices that are consistent with the critical success factor 
Monitoring and Providing Oversight to Achieve Desired Outcomes. 
d.  Enabling Financial Accountability 
The GAO Framework states, “throughout the acquisition process, financial 
information should be tracked and communicated in a way that enables effective 
evaluation and assessment of acquisition activities. When financial data are not 
useful, relevant, timely, or reliable, the acquisition function—as well as other 
functions across an organization—are at risk of inefficient or wasteful business 
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The responses were positive that personnel had access to timely contractual 
and financial information. On the other hand, there was a negative response to the 
financial system integrating with contract management system. One interviewee 
stated, “It takes a lot of different systems to track financial data which makes the job 
time consuming.” 
The results were inconclusive on measuring how often erroneous or improper 
payments are made. However, one comment that was made during the interviews 
indicated “Contract administration suffers from inadequate staffing levels, lack of 
1102 experience, and competing priorities.” The GAO Framework cautions 
organizations to be aware if inadequate transaction processing, particularly improper 
payments, occur frequently. In addition, taking appropriate corrective action when 
the contractor is not meeting contract requirements is an important step to ensure 
that TCAQ is maximizing the limited budgets of its customers. These overall 
responses in this section are consistent with respect to the critical success factor 
Enabling Financial  Accountability. 
F.  Recommendations 
The recommendations in this section are based on the web-based survey and 
semi-structured interviews with TCAQ personnel. 
 The initial recommendation is to continue the use of cross-functional 
teams to maintain the collaborative environment within the 
organization.   
 We recommend the continued use of “Director’s Calls” and suggest the 
implementation of feedback systems to allow TCAQ personnel to voice 
their concerns about the effectiveness of acquisition processes and 
areas of improvement. 
 We recommend reevaluating the efficacy of current metrics and 
mechanisms as well as the In-process Review (IPR) meetings with 
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 We recommend that TCAQ establish an intern program to train entry-
level project managers, including tiered succession planning for future 
program manager positions. Additionally, we recommend TCAQ 
investigate funding advanced academic degree positions in their 
organization that encourages acquisition officers from all Services to 
attend NPS for an acquisition degree. In return, these officers could be 
assigned to a three-year acquisition tour with the USTRANSCOM, 
which would create a flow of advanced-education military project 
managers for TCAQ, including the opportunity to satisfy their joint-
service requirement. 
The final recommendation relates to an area of concern voiced during our 
semi-structured interviews. All 11 interviews had one common theme related to a 
lack of staffing. Program managers commented that the lack of staffing forces them 
to prioritize which of the required tasks could be accomplished. When asked what 
changes in the external environment appear to be having the greatest impact on the 
organization, one program manager said, “The loss of several PMs.” The program 
manager continued, “It’s stressful when you have so much to do and you feel like 
you can’t do everything to the level that you want to do it. So, you end up doing a 
little here, a little there, a little there, and I don’t think—I don’t feel like my programs 
get their full due at this point in time.” 
G.  Summary 
In this chapter we presented the findings from the web-based survey given to 
TCAQ personnel. We then analyzed the results by comparing it to the “look for” and 
“cautions” of the GAO assessment framework to indicate practices that either assist 
or hinder good acquisitions outcomes. Finally, we provided recommendations based 
on the analysis.  The next chapter will contain a summary of the entire research, 
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V.  Summary, Research Questions and Goals, 
Conclusion, and Recommendations for 
Further Research 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary, the goals of the research questions and a 
conclusion to the research. This chapter also provides recommendations for further 
research related to improving acquisition within the USTRANSCOM. 
B.  Summary 
This research began by examining the Defense Acquisition Environment. 
Within this environment, the Defense Acquisition System was identified as the DoD’s 
implementation of a project management approach to defense acquisition.  
Organizational assessment tools and their benefits were then investigated. These 
tools measured the effectiveness of the project management approach through an 
analysis of an organization’s policies and processes. The GAO Framework for 
Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies was the final tool described 
and, ultimately, used for this research. 
An overview of the United States Transportation Command and its major 
component organizations was then examined. Background information was 
discussed on the USTRANSCOM’s acquisition authority as well as TCAQ’s 
organizational structure and program management activities. 
The set-up, methodology and demographics of the survey were then 
discussed.  The survey statements were derived from the first two of the four total 
cornerstones of the GAO Framework. There were 19 survey responses out of 40 
personnel that received the 57-question survey, resulting in a 47.5% response rate. 
The survey results were based on a majority percentage method. Highlighted 
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presented and organized into three specific elements: Aligning Acquisition with 
Agency’s Missions and Needs, Commitment from Leadership, and Effectively 
Managing the Acquisition Process. Each of the elements is associated with specific 
questions from the survey. Finally, this analysis formed the basis of the 
recommendations offered. 
C.  Research Questions and Goals 
The two research questions for this project were: 
 How does TCAQ align acquisition with the organization’s mission and 
needs? 
 How has TCAQ’s recent reorganization affected program management 
processes? 
According to the GAO Framework, the end goal of organizational alignment is 
to ensure that the acquisition function enables the agency to meet its overall 
missions and needs. The acquisition function needs proper management support 
and visibility within the organization to meet that goal (GAO, 2005b, p. 3). The 
research indicates that TCAQ has aligned acquisition to meet its overall mission and 
needs through effective communication, commitment from leadership, and the use of 
cross-functional teams. 
The GAO Framework’s Policies and Processes section provides the guidance 
to evaluate the second question concerning how TCAQ’s recent reorganization 
affected program management processes. Policies and Processes embody the 
basic principles that govern the way an agency performs the acquisition function. To 
be effective, policies and processes must be accompanied by controls and 
incentives to ensure they are translated into practice (GAO, 2005b, p. 13). The 
research indicates that the recent organization of TCAQ has affected program 
management processes. Respondents recognized that change had occurred to the 
organization’s mission and workforce. The increased workload from fighting two 









limitation of experienced program managers, is creating a stressful work 
environment, as indicated by the interviews with TCAQ personnel. All eleven 
interviewees commented on the increased operational tempo and lack of 
experienced personnel as affecting their ability to properly perform their duties. 
The two primary goals of this research were as follows: 
 To provide TCAQ with an assessment of its organizational structure, 
and  
 To review and analyze TCAQ’s program management processes. 
The first goal of this research was achieved by providing TCAQ with an 
assessment of its organizational structure based on the GAO Framework for 
Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies. Cornerstone 1 provided 
critical success factors in the areas of organizational leadership and alignment. 
These appearances or lack of these critical success factors may indicate the 
strengths and weaknesses of TCAQ’s organizational structure. 
The second goal of this research was achieved by reviewing and analyzing 
TCAQ’s program management processes using Cornerstone 2 of the GAO 
Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies. Cornerstone 
2 provided critical success factors in the areas of polices and processes. Polices 
such as the use of cross-functional teams and processes such as the use of project 
plans were positive indicators in this area. 
D.  Conclusions 
The following conclusions were reached from this research and are based on 
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1.  TCAQ Leadership is Perceived to Communicate Effectively with 
and Have a Positive Attitude Toward Its Workforce 
As outlined in Chapter IV, results from the surveys and semi-structured 
interviews indicate strong perceptions in this area. 
2. The Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders in the Acquisition 
Process are Not Well Defined; However, TCAQ Leadership is 
Perceived to Hold Stakeholders Accountable for Their Actions 
Results indicated that stakeholders (i.e., TCAQ acquisition personnel, end-
users, service/IT contractors, etc.) do not have well-defined roles and responsibilities 
within the TCAQ acquisition process. While the results were inconclusive on 
leadership empowering stakeholders, the majority of respondents agreed that TCAQ 
leadership holds stakeholders accountable for their actions. These results highlight a 
potential area of concern when stakeholders are held accountable for their actions, 
yet their roles and responsibilities are not well defined. 
3.  The Following Changes to the Mission and Work Force Following  
the TCAQ Reorganization were Observed 
 Mission: Fighting two wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as assuming 
acquisition authority for its own programs. 
 Workforce: TCAQ restructured its organization to include PMs.  
Furthermore, the loss of several of these PMs to retirement, as well as 
lateral job movements. Finally, the addition of support contractors with 
program management experience. 
4.  TCAQ Utilizes Cross-functional Teams and These Teams Use 
Project Plans 
TCAQ’s utilizes cross-functional teams for all of its programs. These teams 
are comprised of the following disciplines: program management, engineering, 
budgeting, logistics management and contracting. Functionally aligned groups, 
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organizational structures recommended by different management philosophies 
(DoD, 2003, p. 112). 
According to the GAO Framework, project plans should be used to manage 
and control project implementation. Project plans are also known as program plans 
in DoD acquisitions (DoD, 2003, p. 29). These plans should include performance  
measurement baselines for schedule, cost, and major milestones. By using project 
plans, TCAQ’s program teams are positioned to monitor the effectiveness of 
acquisition strategy implementation. 
5.  There Are Insufficient Metrics Related to Acquisition Efficiency 
and Risks; the Results of Metrics May be Insufficiently Briefed to 
Leadership 
The GAO Framework cautions against organizations that do not utilize 
metrics and mechanisms for addressing risks that arise in response to changing 
conditions. The key to the risk-monitoring process is to establish a cost, schedule 
and performance-management indicator system that the PM and other key 
personnel use to evaluate the status of the program. The indicator system should be 
designed to provide early warning of potential problems to allow management 
actions. Risk monitoring is not a problem-solving technique, but  a proactive 
technique to obtain objective information on the progress to date in reducing risks to 
acceptable levels (DoD, 2003, p. 148). Survey results and interviews indicated that 
while TCAQ does have metrics, TCAQ personnel question their usefulness. 
Interviews with TCAQ personnel also revealed that TCAQ does utilize IPRs to 
evaluate its programs; however, the survey results highlight a potential area of 
concern relating to the effectiveness of these reviews.   
The next section will provide several areas for further research that were 
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E.  Recommendations for Further Research 
Several recommendations for additional research emerged from the present 
study.  As mentioned earlier, this research was limited in scope. It is recommended 
that TCAQ conduct a follow-on assessment utilizing the other two GAO Framework 
cornerstones, Human Capital and Knowledge and Information Management. This 
can be accomplished organically or by another student at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS).  Further research should investigate the professional maturity of 
TCAQ’s program managers, focusing on individual competence and based on the 
PMBOK model. Finally, the USTRANSCOM could gain further insight into its 
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APPENDIX A.   Delegation Letter 
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APPENDIX B.  Survey and Results 
1.  Informed Consent Form 
Introduction: You are invited to participate in a study entitled Acquisition in USTRANSCOM: 
An Organizational Assessment. 
 
Procedures: The purpose of this study is to assess the acquisition function within 
USTRANSCOM through a web-based survey (all personnel within TCAQ division) and some 
semi-structured interviews. The survey and interview questions all have been derived from 
Government Accountability Office Report GAO–05–218G (Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies). The online survey will take ~20 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Risks: The potential risks of participating in this study are: risk of breach of confidentiality for 
our semi-structured interview participants. However, all documents will be safeguarded to 
the highest reasonable extent to avoid individual names associated with responses being 
obtained by personnel other than the primary investigator, co-researcher and his advisors. 
 
Benefits: The anticipated benefit from this study is an MBA professional report which will be 
delivered to USTRANSCOM. This report will document our research and offer 
recommendations on USTRANSCOM’s acquisition function. 
 
Compensation: No tangible compensation will be given. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act: Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep 
your personal information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot 
be guaranteed (interview participants). However, it is possible that the researcher may be 
required to divulge information obtained in the course of this research to the subject’s chain 
of command or other legal body. The individual providing information will be held 
confidential by the researcher. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: Participation in this study is strictly voluntary, and if 
agreement to participation is given, it can be withdrawn at any time without prejudice. 
 
Points of Contact: I understand that if I have any questions or comments regarding this 
project upon the completion of my participation, I should contact the Principal Investigator, 
Dr. Rene G. Rendon, 831–656–3464, rgrendon@nps.edu. Any other questions or concerns 
may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School. IRB Chair, LCDR Paul O’Connor , 
831–656–3864, peoconno@nps.edu. 
Statement of Consent: The purpose, procedures, and duration of participation in this 
research project have been fully explained. I understand how my identification will be 
safeguarded and have had all my questions answered. By clicking next I agree to participate 
in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research I do not waive any 
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 APPENDIX C. USTRANSCOM TCAQ Survey 
1. Is your job at USTRANSCOM more closely associated with: 
 












2. My organization has experienced significant changes in its mission since the 
reorganization of USTRANSCOM Acquisition.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 









skipped question 5 
 
3. My organization has experienced significant changes in its budget since the 
reorganization of USTRANSCOM Acquisition.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
4. My organization has experienced significant changes in its workforce since the 
reorganization of USTRANSCOM Acquisition.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
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5. My organization has experienced significant changes in its technology since the 
reorganization of USTRANSCOM Acquisition.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












6. My organization has mechanisms to anticipate, identify, and react to risks presented by 
changes in conditions that can affect acquisition related goals.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











7. My organization has metrics related to acquisition efficiency, effectiveness, and results 
that are included as part of overall performance plan and communicated regularly to 
senior leaders and management.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
8. The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the acquisition process are well 
defined. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
efinitely Agree 
Agree 
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9. Leadership empowers stakeholders to coordinate, integrate, and ensure consistency 
among acquisition actions. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












10.  Stakeholders are held accountable for their actions. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











11.  Senior leadership communicates strategic, integrated, and organization-wide vision for 
the acquisition function. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











12.  I feel that senior leadership effectively communicates the organization’s missions, values, 
and guiding principles for the acquisition function, to agency personnel. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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13.  I feel leadership and management has a positive and supportive attitude toward the 
organization’s workforce. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












14.  Managers at all levels are held accountable for their contributions to the acquisition 
process 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












15.  I have been asked for my view on the effectiveness of this communication. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











16.  Stakeholders have been asked for their views on the effectiveness of the existing 
acquisition process and areas needing improvement.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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17.  My organization uses cross-functional teams in performing acquisitions 
activities. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












18.  I feel empowered to make decisions that affect the project’s outcome. 
 
Answer Options Response Response Percent Count 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
19.  I use a project plan to manage and control implementation of projects. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
20.  My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for schedule and 
cost. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
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21.  My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for major milestones and 
target dates.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












22.  My project’s plan uses performance measurement baselines for risk associated with 
the project. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
23.  I involve individuals outside the project team to regularly review the status of cost, 
schedule or performance goals.
 
Answer Options Response Response Percent Count 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 









skipped question 5 
 
24.  There are incentives in place to encourage my team to meet project goals. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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25.  Our teams are held accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance 
goals. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
 
26.  There is open, honest and clear communication among all stakeholders (team 
members, program officials, contractors)
 
Answer Options Response Response Percent Count 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5 
 
28.  My organization has a process to identify key contractors and subcontractors. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











29.  The strategic purchasing managers in our organization are actively involved in 
defining requirements with internal stakeholders.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
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30.  My organization uses a rigorous contractor selection process to create a strong supplier 
base. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












31.  My organization uses strategic purchasing managers for key goods and services. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











32.  The strategic purchasing managers in our organization are actively involved in 
negotiating with potential providers of goods and services
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5
 
33.  The strategic purchasing managers in our organization are actively involved in assisting 
and resolving performance or other issues after the contract is awarded. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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34.  My organization provides training to its acquisition workforce on how to manage 
supplier (contractor) relationships.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












35.  My organization has established an effective communication and feedback system with 
its suppliers (contractors) to continually assess and improve its own and its supplier’s 
performance. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5
 
36.  My organization fosters an environment in which its suppliers (contractors) invest their 
intellectual capital—their ideas—into the venture.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











38.  My organization tracks the types of acquisition methods used for acquiring goods and 
services to assess workload and training requirements.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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39.  My organization has processes and controls in place to ensure effective oversight of 
supplier (contractor) performance.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












40.  My organization clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for those who perform 
contract management and oversight.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











41.  My organization has taken required actions to ensure that it has adequate staff with 
the right skills, knowledge, and training to implement policies and processes and to 
oversee suppliers (contractors).
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











42.  My organization uses agency personnel or external parties with appropriate 
knowledge, skills, and responsibilities to monitor internal control over the acquisition 
process on a continuous basis.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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43.  My organization effectively uses and requires its contractors to use earned value 
management as an investment planning and control tool.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












44.  My organization monitors the effectiveness of acquisition policies and processes.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











45.  My organization completes a cost benefit analysis when considering alternative policies 
and processes. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











46.  In my organization, a significant percentage (>50%) of contracts fail to meet 
cost. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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47.  In my organization, a significant percentage (>50%) of contracts fail to meet 
schedule. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












48.  In my organization, a significant percentage (>50%) of contracts fail to meet 
performance. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











49.  In my organization, a significant percentage (>50%) of contracts fail to meet quality 
requirements. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











51.  Our acquisition force has access to and uses timely contractual financial information to 
monitor and oversee individual acquisitions.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
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52.  My organization’s financial management system integrates with the contract 
management system. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












53.  Our financial management system reports frequently enough to provide reasonable 
assurance of accountability in acquisitions.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 











54.  Financial data resulting from new contracts, task orders and contract modifications is 
clear and recorded properly.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 








answered question 19 
skipped question 5
 
55.  My organization measures how often erroneous or improper payments are 
made. 
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 
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56.  My organization takes appropriate corrective action when the contractor is not 
meeting expectations for cost, schedule or performance.
 
Answer Options Response Response 
Definitely Agree 
Agree 












APPENDIX D.  GAO Assessment Framework Indicators for 
“Effectively Managing the Acquisition Process” 
1.  Critical Success Factor—“Organizing the Acquisition Function 
to Operate Strategically” 
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ Has the agency assessed the current structure of the 
acquisition function and related controls?  If so, what were 
the results of the study? 
¾ Has the agency experienced significant changes in its 
missions, budget, workforce, technology, or other internal or 
external factors? What changes, if any, did the agency make 
in response to such factors? 
¾ Does the agency have mechanisms to anticipate, identify, 
and react to risks presented by changes in conditions that 
can affect agency-wide or acquisition related goals? 
¾ Does the agency have metrics related to acquisition 
efficiency, effectiveness, and results that are included as part 
of overall performance plan and communicated regularly to 
senior leaders and management? Are these metrics linked to 
agency missions and goals? 
¾ Does the agency use its strategic and annual performance 
plan to document the contribution that agency officials expect 
the acquisition function will make to the agency’s missions, 
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LOOK FOR 
¾ The acquisition function’s mission is well-defined, and its 
vision for the future, core values, goals, and strategies are 
consistent with and support the agency’s overall missions. 
¾ The current structure of the acquisition function has been 
assessed in response to changes, such as in the missions, 
operating environment, budget, workforce, or technology. 
¾ Outcome-oriented performance measures are used to 
assess the success of the acquisition function. These 
measures should be designed to gauge the contribution that 
the acquisition function makes to support the agency’s 
missions and goals. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ The agency lacks a clear definition of the acquisition 
function’s mission, vision, core values, goals, or 
strategies. 
¾ The agency has not assessed the role of the acquisition 
function in response to significant changes. 
¾ The agency lacks a mechanism for addressing risks that 
arise in response to changing conditions. 
¾ Performance measures are not used to evaluate the 
usefulness of the acquisition function to support the 
agency’s missions. 
2. Critical Success Factor—“Clearly Defining and Integrating 
Roles and Responsibilities” 
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ What are the roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders in the agency’s acquisition process? 
¾ Does the agency empower stakeholders to coordinate, 
integrate, and ensure consistency among acquisition 
actions? 
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LOOK FOR 
¾ Each stakeholder in the acquisition process has clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities. 
¾ There is a shared understanding of each participant’s 
role in acquisition activities. 
¾ Key stakeholders are empowered to coordinate, 
integrate, and implement decisions about acquisitions. 
¾ Acquisition managers support the agency’s strategic-
planning and decision making needs at field and 
headquarters levels. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ The acquisition function’s role is unclear.  Acquisition 
and other agency offices do not clearly communicate 
and cooperate. 
¾ There is little integration of acquisition planning among the 
different agency entities with a role in acquisitions. 
¾ Conflicts among stakeholders are left unresolved, 
thereby resulting in inefficient operations. 
¾ The agency’s acquisition office is frequently bypassed. 
3. Critical   Success   Factor—“Clear,   Strong,   and   Ethical   
Executive Leadership” 
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ Does the agency have a chief acquisition officer? Is the 
officer’s primary responsibility managing acquisitions? 
¾ Has senior leadership articulated a strategic, integrated, 
and agencywide vision for the acquisition function? 
¾ Is senior leadership actively involved in pursuing changes, 
if appropriate, to how the agency acquires goods and 
services? 
¾ Are managers at all levels held accountable for their 
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¾ Does agency leadership promote integration and 
coordination among the agency’s budgetary processes 
and human capital, acquisition, and financial management 
functions? 
¾ Does agency leadership and management have a 
positive and supportive attitude toward internal control? 
¾ Has agency management recently reviewed its key 
acquisition-related internal controls? If so, what were the 
results? Are all aspects of the acquisition program covered in 
the internal control review? 
LOOK FOR 
¾ The agency has a chief acquisition officer dedicated to 
managing acquisitions in the agency. 
¾ Senior leadership provides direction and vision, facilitates the 
development of common processes and approaches, and is 
involved in identifying and assessing risks associated with 
meeting acquisition objectives. 
¾ Senior leadership promotes a strategic, integrated, and 
agencywide approach to acquisition, as appropriate. 
¾ Improvement initiatives involve stakeholders from across the 
agency. 
¾ Senior leadership and management set a positive and 
supportive attitude toward internal control. 
¾ Senior leadership and management support monitoring to 
assess the quality of internal control performance and to 
ensure that issues are promptly resolved. 
¾ Senior leadership and management have assessed risks the 
agency faces from external and internal sources in relation 
to acquisition objectives. 
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CAUTIONS 
¾ There is no chief acquisition officer, or the officer has 
other significant responsibilities and may not have 
management of acquisition as his or her primary 
responsibility. 
¾ Senior leadership has not defined a common direction 
or vision for the acquisition function. 
¾ Senior leadership does not continually support efforts to 
develop common processes and approaches. 
¾ Senior leadership does not adequately set and maintain 
the agency’s ethical tone, provides little guidance for 
proper behavior, and fails to remove temptations for 
unethical behavior or provide discipline when appropriate. 
¾ Senior leadership has not comprehensively identified risks 
and considered all significant interactions between the 
agency and other parties. 
¾ Agency management does not have adequate 
resources and support to implement common process 
and approaches. 
¾ Agency personnel do not understand the importance of 
developing and implementing good internal controls. 
 
4. Critical Success Factor—“Effective Communication and 
Continuous Improvement” 
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ How does agency leadership communicate the agency’s 
missions, values, and guiding principles, as well as its vision 
and expectations for the acquisition function, to agency 
personnel? 
¾ Have agency personnel been asked for their views on the 
effectiveness of this communication? 
¾ Does agency leadership facilitate and support clear lines 
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¾ Have stakeholders been asked for their views on the 
effectiveness of the existing acquisition process and 
areas needing improvement? 
¾ What metrics does the agency use to demonstrate the 
impact and value of the acquisition function in supporting the 
agency’s missions? 
¾ What process does the agency use to develop these metrics? 
¾ Are control activities an integral part of the agency’s 
planning, implementation, review, and accountability 
activities to ensure results and stewardship of government 
resources?  
¾ Does the agency or an independent organization 
continuously monitor control activities for their effectiveness 
at ensuring acquisition objectives are met? 
 
LOOK FOR 
¾ Agency leadership listens to its program units and other 
affected parties’ needs and concerns and remains open 
to revising acquisition processes as appropriate. 
¾ Revisions to processes reflect appropriate incorporation of 
affected parties’ needs and concerns. 
¾ Metrics used by agency leadership are targeted at 
demonstrating the impact and value of the acquisition 
function and provide useful feedback to identify areas for 
improvement. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ There is inadequate communication from agency leadership 
regarding the effectiveness of the acquisition function and 
how it supports agency missions. 
¾ There is no mechanism in place for stakeholders to 
provide suggestions for improvement to the acquisition 
process. 
¾ Little change is made to acquisition processes based 
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¾ Internal control monitoring does not occur in the course of 
normal operations, is not performed continually, and is not 
ingrained in the agency’s operations. 
¾ The agency has inadequate policies, procedures, 
techniques, and mechanisms in place to ensure effective 
implementation of management directives. 
¾ The agency has not implemented a program to 
continuously measure and assess the acquisition 
function’s performance in supporting the agency’s 
missions or achieving acquisition goals. 
¾ Performance measures are in place but are not 
consistently utilized or communicated.  
5. Critical Success Factor—“Empowering Cross-Functional 
Teams”  
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ To what extent does the agency use cross-functional teams in 
performing acquisition activities? Are staff from field offices 
involved at any level? How? 
¾ Do team members feel empowered to make decisions, and 
are they invested in the project’s outcome? 
¾ Do the teams use a project plan to manage 
and control project implementation? 
¾ Does the project plan include performance measurement 
baselines for schedule and cost, major milestones, and target 
dates and risks associated with the project? 
¾ Do individuals outside the project team regularly review 
the status of cost, schedule, and performance goals? 
¾ Are incentives in place to encourage teams to meet project 
goals? 
¾ How are teams held accountable for meeting cost, schedule, 
and performance goals? 
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LOOK FOR 
¾ The agency uses cross-functional teams to plan for and 
manage projects. 
¾ These teams develop a project plan to implement projects 
effectively. 
¾ The agency systematically monitors project performance 
and establishes controls and incentives for 
accountability. 
¾ Open, honest, and clear communication is encouraged 
among all parties, including team members, program 
officials, and contractors. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ The agency makes limited use of cross-functional teams. 
¾ Project team members do not feel empowered to make 
decisions or invested in the project outcome. 
¾ Teams fail to use key elements of good project 
management techniques, including monitoring project 
performance and establishing controls and incentives to 
meet project goals. 
6. Critical Success Factor—“Managing and Engaging Suppliers”  
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ Does the agency have a process to identify key suppliers? 
¾ Does the agency use a rigorous supplier selection process 
to create a strong supplier base? 
¾ Has the agency established commodity managers for key 
goods and services? 
¾ What is the role of the commodity manager? 
¾ Has the agency embraced effective supplier relationships 
as a core business strategy? 
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¾ Has the agency established an effective communication and 
feedback system with its suppliers to continually assess and 
improve its own and its suppliers’ performance? 
¾ Does the agency foster an environment in which 
suppliers invest their intellectual capital—their ideas—
into the venture? 
LOOK FOR 
¾ The agency uses stringent supplier selection criteria 
while maintaining an appropriate level of competition 
among suppliers. 
¾ The agency has established commodity managers for key 
goods and services. 
¾ Commodity managers are actively involved in defining 
requirements with internal clients, negotiating with 
potential providers of goods and services, and assisting in 
resolving performance or other issues after the contract is 
awarded. 
¾ The agency has established an effective communication and 
feedback system with its suppliers, such as designating an 
authoritative person as a single interface with key suppliers; 
using integrated teams to facilitate sharing of information; 
establishing an objective basis for providing feedback by 
setting performance measures and expectations in terms of 
quality, responsiveness, timeliness, and cost; providing 
periodic “report cards” and meeting formally with key 
suppliers to discuss issues; and using surveys, supplier 
meetings, and formal agency-supplier councils or supplier 
advisory councils to assess existing customer-supplier 
working arrangements, identify problem areas, and report 
back to suppliers. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ Knowledge of its key suppliers is not shared across the 
agency. 
¾ The agency does not take full advantage of the suppliers’ 
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¾ The agency makes limited or no use of commodity managers 
to manage the acquisition of key goods and services. 
¾ Commodity managers lack expertise, knowledge, or 
adequate training in the goods and services being procured. 
¾ The agency is dependent on one or two suppliers for key goods 
or services. 
¾ The agency continues to select the same suppliers without 
periodically assessing whether the goods and services 
offered are competitive in terms of price, quality, and 
performance. 
¾ The acquisition workforce lacks the skills, knowledge, 
and expertise to manage supplier relationships 
effectively. 
7. Critical  Success  Factor—“Monitoring  and  Providing  Oversight  
to Achieve Desired Outcomes” 
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ Does the agency track the types of acquisition methods 
used for acquiring goods and services to assess workload 
and training requirements? 
¾ What tools, processes, and controls does the agency use to 
ensure effective oversight of contractor performance? 
¾ What tools, processes, and controls does the agency use to 
ensure effective oversight of employees making purchases? 
¾ What incentives does the acquisition workforce have to 
effectively monitor contractor performance? 
¾ Does the agency clearly define the roles and 
responsibilities for those who perform contract management 
and oversight? 
¾ What actions has the agency taken to ensure that it has 
adequate staff with the right skills, knowledge, and training to 
implement policies and processes and to oversee contractors? 
¾ Do agency personnel or external parties with appropriate 
knowledge, skills, and responsibilities monitor internal control 
over the acquisition process on a continuous basis? 
¾ Does the agency effectively use and require its contractors to 
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LOOK FOR 
¾ The agency has undertaken a workforce-planning effort to 
ensure that individuals who award, manage, and monitor 
contracts have clearly defined roles and responsibilities and 
have the appropriate workload, skills, and training to perform 
their jobs effectively. 
¾ The agency employs contract monitoring plans or risk-based 
strategies, and tracks contractor performance. 
¾ The agency regularly reviews contract oversight processes, 
identifies areas needing improvement, and establishes and 
implements corrective action plans. 
¾ The agency monitors the effectiveness of policies and 
processes, completes a cost benefit analysis when 
considering alternative policies and processes, and follows up 
on findings identified in monitoring efforts. 
¾ The agency’s suppliers have established earned value 
management systems, and the agency verifies that it and its 
suppliers effectively implement earned value management 
processes and procedures on all applicable programs. 
CAUTIONS 
¾ Personnel responsible for contract management have skills and 
knowledge gaps that inhibit their ability to properly oversee the 
types of contracts used by the agency. 
¾ The agency does not monitor whether its contracts meet 
cost, schedule, performance, and quality requirements. 
¾ A significant percentage of contracts fail to meet cost, 
schedule, performance, and quality requirements. 
¾ The agency does not assign clear roles and 
responsibilities for overseeing contracts. 
¾ There are material weaknesses and/or reportable 
conditions related to acquisitions in the agency’s 
performance and accountability report. 
¾ Earned value data are unavailable or unreliable, and earned 
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8. Critical Success Factor—“Enabling Financial Accountability”  
KEY QUESTIONS 
¾ Does the acquisition workforce have access to and use timely 
contractual financial information to monitor and oversee 
individual acquisitions? 
¾ Is the agency’s financial management system integrated 
with its contract management system? 
¾ Does the financial management system report frequently 
enough to provide reasonable assurance of accountability in 
acquisitions? 
¾ Are financial data resulting from new contracts, task 
orders, and contract modifications clear and recorded 
properly? 
¾ Does the agency measure how often erroneous or improper 
payments are made? Is a risk assessment process in place 
to address improper payments? 
LOOK FOR 
¾ The acquisition workforce has ready access to information 
on obligated and expended funds, with sufficient information 
to assure proper oversight and accounting at the contract 
level. 
¾ Entries are made to the financial management system that 
updates the contract management and property accountability 
systems. 
¾ The agency reports frequently enough—monthly or 
quarterly—to ensure accountability in the acquisition 
function. 
¾ Adjustments to contract accounting records are clearly reported 
and accurate; such adjustments represent a low percentage of 
financial transactions. 
¾ Erroneous and improper payments and cost overruns are 
tracked and are not a significant problem. 
¾ The agency takes appropriate corrective action when the 
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CAUTIONS 
¾ Acquisition and financial management staff lacks access to 
critical information, including fiscal year; appropriation/Treasury 
fund symbol; organization code; cost center; object 
classification; estimated amount; project code; program code; 
transaction date; action code; subject-to-funds availability 
indicator; asset identifier code; contractor code/name; trading 
partner; trading partner code; award date; and amounts 
increased and/or decreased. 
¾ Acquisition and financial management staff independently 
update the same types of data into independent financial 
and contract management systems. 
¾ Financial management systems fail to provide transaction 
details to support account balances or identify the method of 
acquisition, lack evidence that the contractor’s final invoice has 
been submitted and paid, or fail to perform other transaction 
processing and routine accounting activities adequately. 
¾ Inadequate transaction processing, particularly improper 
payments, occurs frequently. 
¾ Financial management systems fail to include the taxpayer 
identification number for contractor identification and income 
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